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Developing a Positive Theory of Decisionmaking
on U.S. Courts of Appeals
TRACEY E. GEORGE*
As the decisions of the United States Courts of Appeals become an
increasingly important part of American legal discourse, the debate concerning
adjudication theories of the circuit courts gain particular relevance. Whereas,
to date, the issue has received mostly normative treatment, this Article proceeds
systematically and confronts the positive inquiry: how do courts of appeals
judges actually decide cases? The Article proposes theoretically, tests
empirically, and considers the implications of, a combined atttudinal and
strategic model of en banc court of appeals decisionmaking. The results
challenge the classicist judges, legal scholars, and practitioners' normative
frameworks, and suggest positive theory's central function in the growing
debate.
I. INTRODUCTION
The United States Courts of Appeals sit at the juncture between local trial
courts and a national appellate tribunal. They are the "'vital center of the
[federal] judicial system."" Since at least the midpoint of this century, they
have acted as the final arbiter in nearly all appeals from district courts and
federal agencies. 2 Of greater moment, these courts have increasingly defined
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1 J. WOODFoRD HOWARD, JR., COURTS OF APPEALS IN THE FEDERAL JuDIcIAL SYSTEM:
A STUDY OF THE SECOND, FrnrH, AND DmTRICT OF COLUMBIA CuRcunrs 8 (1981) (quoting J.
Edward Lumbard, Current Problems of the Federal Courts of Appeals, 54 CORNEU.L L. REv.
29, 29 (1968)).
2 The Judiciary Act of 1925 gave the Supreme Court discretionary control over its
caseload. Judiciary Act of 1925, Pub. L. No. 68-415, 43 Stat. 936 (codified as amended at 28
U.S.C. § 1254 (1994)). Immediately after passage of the 1925 Act, the Supreme Court
granted review to only 20% of the petitions for certiorari, excluding in forma pauperis
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
and developed principles of law and policy directly governing their respective
regions and indirectly affecting the rest of the nation. Accordingly, although the
United States Supreme Court is technically the final word on federal law and
cases, the circuit courts have become the courts of last resort for most litigants
and the sources of doctrinal development for most legal issues.
Recognizing the increasing relevance of and pressure on federal courts of
appeals, legal scholars have started to refocus the debate regarding adjudication
theories (that is, the proper role of judges and the appropriate bases for
judging), judicial appointment, court procedure, and court structure from the
Supreme Court to the lower appellate courts.3 The scholarly exchanges have
petitions. The percentage has steadily dropped since 1926: to 11% in 1960 and to 4% in
1995. See LEE EpsrEI ET AL., Tim SuPREm COURT COMPENDiuM: DATA, DECisIoNs, AND
DEvELoPMENTs 80-81, 83 (2d ed. 1996). The Supreme Court's broader discretion, combined
with dramatic increases in caseload and the expansion of federal law, limit the Court's ability
to supervise and guide the development of national law and principle, because the Court must
usually defer to conclusions reached by lower courts.
In fact, the actual rate of Supreme Court review of lower court rulings is lower than its
rate of granting certiorari because petitions seeking certiorari are filed from only a minority of
circuit court decisions. Donald Songer and Sue Davis have estimated, from a study of three
circuits, that the rate of Supreme Court review of circuit court holdings is less than 1%. See
Sue Davis & Donald R. Songer, The Changing Role of the United States Courts of Appeals:
The Flow of Litigation Revisited, 13 JusT. SYS. J. 323 (1988-89) [hereinafter Davis &
Songer, The Flow of Litigation Revisited]; see also Donald R. Songer, The Circuit Courts of
Appeals, in THE AMMUCAN CoUrTS: A CRrTCAL AssEsSMENT (John B. Gates & Charles A.
Johnson eds., 1991) [hereinafter Songer, The Circuit Courts] (discussing the methodology and
implications of his work with Davis).
Songer and Davis's study was modeled after an earlier study by J. Woodford Howard.
Howard conducted an intensive quantitative review of the flow of litigation from federal
district courts to three federal courts of appeals (District of Columbia, Second, and Fifth
Circuits) and from those three circuits to the Supreme Court. The study covered all cases
decided by the three circuits during the 1965, 1966, and 1967 terms, a total of 4,945 cases.
Howard concluded that the "most striking pattern" in the data was the Supreme Court's very
limited review of the three circuit courts, granting certiorari to only 92, or 9.2%, of the 1,004
cases appealed (20.3 % of all cases decided by the three circuits during that period). The Court
affirmed 25% of the circuit court decisions it reviewed. Thus "the three tribunals became
courts of last resort in 98.1% of the cases and made decisions that formally prevailed in
98.6%." See J. Woodford Howard, Jr., Litigation Flow in Three United States Courts of
Appeals, 8 LAw & Soc'YRnv. 33 (1973).
3 See, e.g., Arthur D. Hellman, Jumboism and Jurisprudence: The Theory and Practice
of Precedent in the Large Appellate Court, 56 U. Cmi. L. REv. 541 (1989) (examining
whether the Ninth Circuit has succeeded in maintaining consistency in the law of the circuit as
it has grown); Lewis A. Kornhauser & Lawrence G. Sager, Unpacking the Court, 96 YAIE
L.J. 82 (1986); see also, e.g., PAUL D. CARRINGTON Er AL., JusTIcE ON APPEAL (1976);
SAMUEL ESRECHER & JOHN SEXToN, RE)EFNIG THE SUPREm COURT'S ROLE: A
THEORY OF MANAGING THE FEDERALJUDIcIAL PRocEss (1986).
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covered a broad range of issues, from theories of constitutional interpretation4
to questions of the judicial system's structure. 5 Scholars have considered the
appropriate functions of intermediate appellate courts as well as the relative
lawmaking and policymaking roles that these courts fill in a system governed
by a single supreme tribunal. 6
Although diverse in their focal points, these debates share a common
characteristic: they are largely normative. To the very limited extent that legal
scholars have considered positive theory at all, they have not tested their
theories in any systematic way.7 This Article assumes that before we can
A similar discussion has been occurring as well with respect to intermediate appellate
courts in state systems. See, e.g., James P. Hopkins, The Role of an Intennediate Appellate
Court, 41 BROOK. L. REV. 459 (1975); Edmund B. Spaeth, Jr., Achieving a Just Legal
System: The Role of State Intermediate Appellate Courts, 462 ANNAS AM. AcAD. POL. &
Soc. Scr. 48 (1982).
4 See, e.g., Sanford Levinson, On Positivism and Potted Plants: "Inferior" Judges and
the Task of Constitutional Interpretation, 25 CONN. L. REv. 843 (1993) (criticizing an article
by Professor Frederick Schauer on legal positivism for failing to consider courts below the
U.S. Supreme Court and, in turn, offering a consideration of positivist constitutional
interpretation in the context of lower courts).
5 See, e.g., THOmAS E. BAKER, RATioNiNG Jusinca ON APPEAL: THE PROBLEmS OF TBE
U.S. COURTS OF APPEALS (1994) (describing a crisis of volume in the circuit courts and
proposing intramural and extramural reforms); RESTUCruRiNG JustiCE: THE INNOVATIONs
OF THm NaNaH CiRcurr AND THE FUTURE OF TB FEDERAL COURTS (Arthur D. Hellman ed.,
1990); Martha J. Dragich, Once a Century: R7me for a Structural Overhaul of the Federal
Courts, 1996 Wis. L. REv. 11 (recommending a dramatic and innovative restructuring of the
federal judicial system in order to accommodate growing caseloads and citing numerous
studies on restructuring the judicial system).
6 See, e.g., Evan H. Caminker, Why Must Inferior Courts Obey Superior Court
Precedent, 46 STAN. L. REv. 817 (1994) (critically examining the historical justifications for
the doctrine of hierarchical precedent and defending the doctrine on alternate grounds);
Michael W. Combs, The Policy-Madng Role of the Courts of Appeals in Northern School
Desegregation: Ambiguity and Judicial Policy-Making, 35 W. POL. Q. 359 (1982) (examining
how courts of appeals have responded to the uncertainty and ambiguity found in policy
pronouncements of the Supreme Court); Benjamin Kaplan, Do Intermediate Appellate Courts
Have a Lawmaking Function?, 70 MASS. L. REv. 10 (1985).
7 Legal scholars relying on positive political theory and public choice/rational choice
theory have developed non-normative, formal models of Supreme Court behavior,
particularly the interaction between the U.S. Supreme Court and the legislative and executive
branches. However, very few legal scholars have tested empirically their formal theories, and
almost none have considered lower courts. See, e.g., Lewis A. Kornhauser, Adjudication by
a Resource-Constrained Team: Hierarchy and Precedent in a Judicial System, 68 S. CAL. L.
REv. 1605 (1995) (setting forth a theory as to how judges working in a multi-tiered system
make decisions by utilizing a "team" model of adjudication, as opposed to an agency model,
but without testing the theory empirically).
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thoughtfully propose modifications in the judicial system, we must first
understand how it works. We should consider theoretically and test empirically
the positive inquiry (i.e., how do court of appeals judges decide cases) as a
preliminary matter in seeking to evaluate and, if necessary, to improve the
workings of these engines of the federal judicial system. Stated another way,
we should first examine how circuit court judges actually make decisions before
we propose that they should (or should not) make them differently.
Professor William Eskridge is an obvious and noteworthy exception to this general trend,
as his work includes empirical testing of positive hypotheses; however, he focuses his studies
on the Supreme Court. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overriding Supreme Court
Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 101 YALE L.J. 331 (1991) [hereinafter Eskridge,
Overriding]; William N. Eskridge, Jr., Reneging on History? Playing the
Court/Congress/President Civil Rights Game, 79 CAL. L. REv. 613 (1991) [hereinafter
Eskridge, Reneging on History].
In addition, political scientists have started to empirically analyze public choice/rational
choice and positive political theories of court decisionmaking (called "strategic models"). But
political scientists, like legal scholars, have focused primarily on the U.S. Supreme Court.
But see Jeffrey A. Segal et al., Decisionmaing on the U.S. Courts of Appeal, in
CoTEMPLATING CoURTs 227 (Lee Epstein ed. 1995) [hereinafter Segal et al.,
Decisionmaking]; Donald R. Songer et al., The Hierarchy of Justice: Testing a Principal-
Agent Theory of Supreme Court-Circuit Court Interaction, 38 AM. J. POL. Sci. 673 (1994);
Steven R. Van Winkle, Dissent as a Signal: Evidence from the U.S. Courts of Appeals
(August 29, 1997) (unpublished paper, presented at the 1997 annual meeting of the American
Political Science Association, Washington, D.C.) (on file with author). Most have examined,
theoretically and empirically, the interaction between the Supreme Court and the legislative
and executive branches (such studies are known as "separation-of-power games"). See, e.g.,
LEE EPSTEIN & JAcK KNIGHT, ThE CHOIcEs JusTIcEs MAKE 138-81 (1998) [hereinafter
EPSrMN & KNIGHT, CHoIces]; Rafael Gely & Pablo T. Spiller, A Rational Choice Theory of
Supreme Court Statutory Decisions with Applications to the State Farm and Grove City
Cases, 6 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 263 (1990); Jack Knight & Lee Epstein, On the Struggle for
Judicial Supremacy, 30 LAw & Soc'Y Rnv. 87 (1996) [hereinafter Knight & Epstein,
Struggle]; McNollgast, Politics and the Courts: A Positive Theory of Judicial Doctrine and
the Rule of Law, 68 S. CAL. L. Rnv. 1631 (1995) (three political scientists-Mathew D.
McCubbins, Roger G. Noll, and Barry R. Weingast-publishing under a hybrid moniker). A
number of political science scholars have examined dynamics internal to the Court, such as
opinion assignment and the decision to review a case. See, e.g., EPsrEIN & KNIGHT,
CHoicas, supra, at 112-37; Robert L. Boucher, Jr., & Jeffrey A. Segal, Supreme Court
Justices as Strategic Decision Makers: Aggressive Grants and Defensive Denials on the
Vinson Court, 57 J. PoL. 824 (1995) (testing the role of strategy in the justices' decisions to
grant certiorari); Forrest Maltznan & Paul J. Wahlbeck, Strategic Policy Considerations and
Voting Fluidity on the Burger Court, 90 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 581 (1996) (examining the
possible reasons a justice would change her vote between the original conference on the
merits and the Court's announcement of a final decision, which is termed "voting fluidity").
For a further discussion of formal modeling of judicial behavior and rational
choice/public choice theory, see infra notes 74-104 and accompanying text.
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Studies of the sources of judicial behavior and the effects of internal and
external pressures on the judicial process have significant implications for
perennial debates over majority rule, judicial accountability, and other values.8
For example, empirical evidence revealing that judges vote to maximize their
personal policy preferences by voting strictly according to their attitudes would
call for a different prescription than evidence demonstrating that judges vote to
be part of the majority rather than to maximize personal preferences. The
former conclusion would suggest that an appointing President should focus on a
judicial candidate's stated policy preferences, while the latter would suggest that
he should examine his prospective appointee's prior voting record, if available,
in "close" cases. Consider another example: social science evidence disclosing
that circuit court decisions are in line with the apparent ideological preferences
of the Supreme Court would allay fears that the growing size of the circuit
court caseload will result in a breakdown in the Court's power to govern the
federal system.
8 The social-scientific study of judicial decisionmaking by exposition of a positive theory
of judicial behavior and the application of quantitative techniques to empirical evidence to test
that theory adds a critical dimension to the consideration of normative questions. See Harry
Kalven, Jr., Toward a Science of Impartial Judicial Behavior, 42 U. CNN. L. REv. 591,
594-95 (1973). Professor Kalven stated:
The fulndamental premise in the idea of impartial judges and rules of law is that certain
kinds of decision-making, for example, by judges, can by institutional arrangements and
role discipline be made to show less variance and less correlation to personal factors than
other kinds of decision-making, for example, voting and consumer
preferences.... Empirical study of judicial behavior must stimulate and sharpen theory
about the aspiration to have a human being who as a judge is tolerably impartial and
tolerably independent.
Id.; see also Segal et al., Decisionmaking, supra note 7, at 229. Here, Professors Segal,
Donald Songer, and Charles Cameron explained that:
The value of this method of understanding courts has long been appreciated. For
example, Oliver Wendell Holmes, in his famous essay "The Path of the Law," advanced
a "prediction theory" of the law. Holmes noted that lawyers must be able to predict what
judges will do in order to advise their clients appropriately. In fact, Holmes put such
stress on prediction that he defined the law itself as nothing more than predictions about
the behavior of judges. Predictions require models. Hence, models of judicial behavior
can be seen as closely connected with the concept of law itself.
Id.; see also Symposium, Social Science Approaches to the Judicial Process, 79 HARv. L.
REV. 1551 (1966); Symposium, Empirical Approaches to Judicial Behavior, 42 U. CNN. L.
REV. 589 (1973).
19981 1639
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To answer the question of how judges make decisions, political scientists
have developed two competing "models" 9 of judicial decisionmaking:
attitudinal and strategic. The attitudinal model is based on an atomistic
understanding of judicial behavior-the judge is viewed as an individual actor
making decisions independently-and posits that the judge seeks to maximize
her sincere policy preferences, termed "attitudes." The strategic model, in
contrast, considers the judge as dependent upon and responsive to the decisions
of her colleagues on the bench and the relative policy positions of other political
institutions. These positive theories of judicial behavior have been almost
entirely developed by hypothesizing about and examining only one judicial
institution, the U.S. Supreme Court.
I propose, test, and consider the implications of a combined attitudinal and
strategic theory of en bane court of appeals decisionmaking. Under this theory,
we can predict circuit court judicial behavior in en banc cases based on the
judges' policy preferences (as measured by the political party of their
appointing President) and/or their compulsion to win (as measured by their
willingness to join a majority opinion even though it conflicts with their policy
preferences). I have examined en banc decisions of one "average" circuit, the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, and found that they support the
9 The term model, as used here and throughout the paper, is intended to connote
explanatory models: those that seek not only to describe phenomena but also to explain them.
Stated another way, an explanatory model is a systematic, empirically verified understanding
of why a phenomenon occurs as it does. A descriptive model of lung cancer would list the
ailments marking the disease (shortness of breath, lesions growing in the lining of the lung,
and so on) whereas an explanatory model of lung cancer would inform us, based on empirical
evidence, as to its causes (smoking, environmental toxins, and so on). Likewise, a description
of appellate decisionmaking would set forth an essentially superficial account of the process:
filing of briefs, presentation of oral arguments, discussion in conference, casting of votes, and
release of an opinion. An explanation would go deeper and actually informs us about how the
final decision was reached and what drove the result announced by the court. A good social
science model will explain a sizeable percentage, though not all, of the observed behavior and
thereby serve as a valuable aid to our understanding of that behavior. See generally Lee
Epstein, Studying Law and Courts, in CONTEMPLATNG CouRTs 1, 7-8 (Lee Epstein ed.,
1995). Here, Professor Epstein underscores the distinction:
[Models in social science are not meant to constitute reality. To the contrary, they are
purposefully designed to ignore certain aspects of the real world and focus instead on a
crucial set of explanatory factors.... When we try to make generalizations about a
phenomenon-say, judicial decision making-we lose specifics that are part of
reality .... Yet, the simplifications inherent in models provide social scientists with
useful handles for understanding the real world and for reaching general conclusions
about the way the world works.
Id. at 8.
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hypothesis that circuit court judges in en banc cases behave according to both
the attitudinal model and the strategic model.
I begin by delineating the two leading models of Supreme Court behavior.
Part II sets out the development of the attitudinal model of judicial behavior.
Part III examines the more recently developed strategic model of judicial
decisionmaking, which has two variations: one focusing on the internal
dynamics at play in the Court and the other considering the external forces
pressuring the Court and its members.
In Part IV, I extrapolate from the two competing Supreme Court models a
theory about the behavior of en banc courts of appeals on a micro-level (the
vote of the individual judge) as well as on a macro-level (the court's decision).
The theory has four components or elements. The first two elements address
the micro-level inquiry and suggest that circuit judges in en banc cases will seek
to maximize either their personal policy preferences or their influence on the
court. Hence, judges will either vote consistently with the ideological direction
("liberal" or "conservative")' ° of the party of their appointing President or vote
strategically ("swing judges")." The second two elements address the macro-
level inquiry and suggest that the en banc court will not vote consistently with
the ideological direction of the majority coalition because of the strategic voting
behavior of swing judges, but -will vote relatively consistently with the
ideological direction of the Supreme Court. In addition to delineating the
reasoning supporting these arguments, I subject each to empirical testing and
find strong empirical support for the micro-level and macro-level components
10 The terms "liberal" and "conservative" are used in this paper in a way consistent with
the meanings traditionally assigned by social commentators and court scholars as well as most
interested observers of the legal system. Most Supreme Court watchers, for example, believe
they can predict with a fair amount of accuracy the vote of the Supreme Court's right wing-
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Thomas-in many cases. We believe we can
predict their decisions because we share a common sense perception about how liberal and
conservative judges vote. For example, in the areas of civil rights and liberties, liberal judges
generally seek to extend freedoms, whereas conservatives seek to limit them. In the realm of
economic regulation, liberal jurists favor an enhanced governmental role in the economy and
tend to uphold legislation that benefits working people or the economic underdog, while
conservatives oppose an increase in government intervention and tend to favor business. In
criminal cases, liberal judges generally are more sympathetic to criminal defendants, while
conservatives tend to favor prosecution and law enforcement. The categorizations are
admittedly broad and cannot account for the complexity of relative ideological positions.
Nevertheless, the terms retain meaning and significance in the course of trying to understand
political phenomena. For a more thorough discussion, see infra notes 22, 129 and
accompanying text.
111 define "swing judge" as a judge who is either loss-averse or status-seeking and as a
consequence votes to join majorities for strategic reasons rather than policy preference
reasons.
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of the theory. I conclude by considering the implications of my results for
efforts to prescribe improvements in the federal judicial system at the
intermediate level.
II. THE EVOLUTION OF AN ATTutDINAL THEORY OF
SUPREME COURT BEHAVIOR
The social scientific study of courts arose out of an interest in explaining
the actions of the Supreme Court or, more particularly, those of certain
justices. 12 As a result, scholars have traditionally focused their court studies on
the behavior of individual justices and, as a consequence, have considered those
justices to be independent, or atomistic, actors. Because of such early and
continued attention, micro-level analysis is the most fully developed,
articulated, and tested positive theory of judicial behavior. A half-century of
study has produced an understanding of the actions of the atomistic judge. A
review of the development of micro-level theory will illuminate the rationale
behind and ideas driving the dominant paradigm of judicial behavior, the
attitudinal model.
A. Formal Legal Theory
Positive theory and normative theory about judicial decisionmaking were
identical in the early part of this century: formalism. 13 Common law
formalism-or what came to be known as Classical Legal Theory-posited that
judicial decisions were based on logical reasoning or reasoning by example. 14
Under this familiar view of judicial decisionmaking, the judge reviews the case
before her and draws inevitable conclusions based on its commonalities with
earlier cases.' 5 This conception of the judiciary can be traced to Montesquieu
12 See, e.g., WALTER F. MURPHY & JOSEpH TANEHUS, THE STUDY OF PUBI C LAW
12 (1972) ("[S]ocial scientists have many, varied, and legitimate interests in studying and
explaining public law and judicial behavior."); Social Science Approaches to the Judicial
Process, supra note 8, at 1551 ("Political scientists have recently begun to investigate new
dimensions of the judicial process."). See generally Van Winkle, supra note 7.
13 See, e.g., Thomas C. Grey, Langdell's Otlhodoxy, 45 U. PrrT. L. REV. 1, 5 (1983)
(discussing the rise of Harvard Law School's first dean, Christopher Columbus Langdell, and
the genesis of Langdell's scientific theory of law known as classical legal orthodoxy).
14 See, e.g., Thomas C. Grey, Book Review, Modem American Legal Thought, 106
YALE L.J. 493, 495-97 (1996). Under Langdellian legal theory, "law should be formal,
producing outcomes by the application of rules to facts without any intervening exercise of
discretion." Id. at 495.
15 See generally EDWARD H. LEVI, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING (1948).
Some scholars label this "mechanical jurisprudence" because the process by which judges
1642 [Vol. 58:1635
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and Blackstone who believed that judicial power must be kept distinct from
executive and legislative powers and should be characterized by a lack of
decisionmaking discretion. 16
Like the Langdellian judge, both legal scholars and social scientists
approached the study of law and courts through the same ostensibly objective
mechanism. Scholars seeking to understand how the Supreme Court reached
decisions examined recent developments in a particular area of law and
postulated about the scope and implications of the developing doctrine. 17
The strong attachment of both legal scholars and social scientists to a
formalist understanding of court behavior may be seen in part as an attempt to
rationalize judicial policymaking in a democracy, specifically by presenting the
judge as a neutral and reasoned decisionmaker and by emphasizing the primacy
of rules. As Felix Frankfurter explained the position: "[o]ur judicial system is
absolutely dependent upon a popular belief that it is as untainted in its workings
as the finite limitations of disciplined human minds and feelings make
possible."' 8 From the Classical Legal perspective, neutral decisionmaking
reach decisions is highly structured and repetitive. See STEEN L. WASBY, THE SUPREME
COURTiNm THE EDERALJUDICiALSYSEM 263-69 (3d ed. 1988).
16 See Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Justiciability and Separation of Powers: A Neo-Federalist
Approach, 81 CoP -LL L. REv. 393, 405-07, 426-27 (1996) (citing BARON DE
MONTEsQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAws (Franz Neumann ed. & Thomas Nugent trans.,
1949) (1748); 1 WJJAM BLACKsTONE, COMMENTARMS) [hereinafter Pushaw, Justiciability];
see also Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Article I"s Case/Controversy Distinction and the Dual
Fwnctions of Federal Courts, 69 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 447, 476-77 (1994) (discussing
Blackstones's adherence to "the axiom that a judge's role was merely to 'expound'-not
'Inake'-the law").
17 The American Political Science Review regularly published individual as well as serial
articles reviewing and cataloging judicial decisions in constitutional law and in public law.
Eugene Wambaugh began the annual survey of the Supreme Court's constitutional law
rulings, see Constitutional Law in 1909-1910, 4 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 483 (1910);
Constitutional Law in 1910-1911, 6 AM. POL. Sca. REv. 513 (1912), which was continued
by Thomas Reed Powell, see Decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States on
Constitutional Questions, 1914-1917, 12 AM. POL. SI. REv. 17 (pt. I), 427 (pt. I), 640 (pt.
Im) (1917); The Constitutional Decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States in the
October Term, 1917, 13 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 229 (1918), and by Edwin Corwin,
Constitutional Law in 1919-1920, Part 1, 14 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 635 (1920); Constitutional
Law in 1919-1920, Part II, 15 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 52 (1921); Constitutional Law in 1920-
1921, 16 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 22 (1922). Similarly, Robert E. Cushman published an annual
article or articles on case developments in public law. These studies were centered on the
notion that previously announced legal doctrine provided the single best predictor and
explainer of Court decisions.
18 Felix Frankfurter, The Berger Decision, NEw REpUBUC, Feb. 23, 1921, reprinted in
FEux FRANKFURTER ON THE SUPREm COURT 78 (Philip Kurland ed., 1970). Interestingly
though, Frankfurter himself often created doctrines (most notably justiciability) by either
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through logical reasoning was adjudication and vice versa; any other act by a
judge would no longer be judging. 19
The Classical Legal model of judicial decisionmaking ignores the obvious
fact that judges have a good deal of discretion in deciding cases. Charles Haines
observed that:
At the same time that the mechanical theory was dominant there were always
justices and magistrates who frankly recognized that under the veil of the
mysterious and divine sources of legal principles, it was necessary for judges to
exercise discretion and to make choices as to the legal rules to be applied. 0
And in exercising that discretion, judges will be guided, at least in part, by their
personal conceptions of public policy and fights; and thus, their decisions
cannot be explained solely by consideration of existing precedent.21 For
example, conservatives and liberals have different perceptions about American
society (e.g., do blacks still suffer from discrimination?) that produce different
decisions. 22 Even when conservatives and liberals share a certain perception
ignoring or distorting prior law to serve his ovm policy preferences. See Pushaw,
Justiciability, supra note 16, at 458-63.
19 Legal Process theorists also adopted this perspective. See, e.g., HENRY M. HART, JR.
& ALBERT M. SAcKs, Tim LEGAL Pkocmss: BAsIc PROBLEmS IN TBE MAmNG AND
APPUCATION OF LAW (tent. ed. 1958). First available in 1958, though only officially
published and commercially available in 1994, this tome was aimed at making law as
coherent and rational as possible through procedural justifications consistent with political
pluralism as espoused by Robert Dahl.
2 0 Charles Grove Haines, General Observations on the Effects of Personal, Political,
and Economic Influences in the Decisions of Judges, 17 ILL. L. REv. 96, 98 (1922). Even
Blackstone recognized that some discretion was necessary. See Pushaw, Justiciability, supra
note 16.
2 1 See generally KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADmON: DECING
APPEALS (1960). In this discursive, Toynbeean text on testing the "method" of American
Legal Realism, Llewellyn delineated and captured the primary themes of Realism and
provided descriptive accounts of different appellate courts to support the behavioral
implications of these themes.
22 Consider the comments of a D.C. Circuit judge in an interview with a political
scientist:
The liberals will line up on the side of the injured; in government regulation cases
involving business, for the public; and in union cases, on the side of the union.
Conservatives will take the side of insurance companies in personal injury cases, and
will support management in disputes with organized labor. These are, of course,
generalizations.
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(e.g., freedom of speech is a cherished right), they will likely disagree on its
value relative to competing concerns (e.g., should the speech rights of
dissidents outweigh the state's interest in maintaining order?). Even accepting
the Classical premise that recitation of law is relevant to a judge's decision, the
judge cannot decide cases without considering the context and consequence of
her decision, nor without the influence of her own thoughts and experiences.
B. Legal Realism
Legal pragmatists adopted as a normative paradigm the observation that
judges cannot make decisions without being influenced by their personal
perceptions. They contended that judges should not try to reach decisions
without considering context and other factors beyond "law on the books." They
argued that case outcomes are the product of a host of internal, attitudinal
factors and that legal rules and doctrines are at best boundaries within which
judges act or, at worst, smoke screens behind which they hide their true
motivations.23 Realists such as Karl Llewellyn expected empirical study to
uncover the various factors that cannot be directly observed but that produce
judicial decisions. 24
In 1948, University of Chicago political scientist C. Herman Pritchett
offered a positive theoretical interpretation of the normative tenets of legal
realism in his social scientific study of the Supreme Court, The Roosevelt
Court.25 Pritchett used simple statistics to evaluate systematically micro-level
voting behavior on the Court between 1937 and 1947. For example, he
identified distinct liberal and conservative voting blocs through agreement
scores (which reflect the percentage rate at which a given justice votes with
another justice) and revealed ideological preferences by counting votes on
particular issues. 26 Pritchett did not present an explanatory model of Supreme
Sheldon Goldman, Conflict on the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 1965-71: A Quantitative Analysis,
42 U. CINN. L. Rnv. 635, 635 (1973). Another judge, from the Second Circuit, concurred:
"If you study the votes over a two or three year period, you will find the pattern." Id.
2 3 See, e.g., JER mE FRANK, LAW AND THm MODERN MNND (1930) (applying
psychological model to the study of the modem legal mind); Karl N. Llewellyn, A Realistic
Jurisprudence-The Next Step, 30 COLUM. L. Ray. 431 (1930). Llewellyn claims to have
introduced the "realist" label into legal scholarship in this Columbia Law Review article. See
LLEWELLYN, supra note 21, at 512; Lon L. Fuller, American Legal Realism, 82 U. PA. L.
REv. 429 (1934).
24 S LLEWELLYN, supra note 21. Llewellyn contended that the purposes of judicial
qinions do not include "report[ing] the process of deciding." Id. at 56.
25 See C. HERMAN PIrrcHrr, THE ROOSEvELT CouRT: A STuDY IN JUDIciA. PoLrncs
ND VALuES, 1937-1947 (1948).
26 See id. at 240-63.
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Court decisionmaling, but he did provide the basis for the development of the
behavioral study of the Supreme Court.
Pritchett's work revolutionized the way scholars thought about judicial
decisionmaking. As Glendon Schubert, one of the country's most influential
court scholars, explained in 1965:
Pritchett's [The Roosevelt Court] is the most important and influential book to
be published in the past two decades in the general field of constitutional law
and politics, and.., a whole generation of political scientists-of whom I am
one-was compelled to modify, some more radically and others less so, their
basic orientation toward the study of the Supreme Court, as a consequence of
having read [it]. 7
C. Attitudinal Model
Building on insights of the Legal Realists-who posited that individual
judges make decisions based on their own values and policy positions-social
scientists have developed "attitudinal" models of judicial decisionmaking that
focus on the justice as an atomistic maximizer of policy preferences.
1. Schubert
Glendon Schubert was the first to attempt to develop and test a model of
micro-level judicial decisionmaldng; 28 he proposed to build a model based on
"attitudes" to discover the forces hidden behind and producing Supreme Court
opinions. 29 Looking to existing scientific studies of human behavior,
specifically the work of social psychologists Louis Thurstone, Clyde Coombs,
and Louis Guttman, he attempted to pierce the veil of judicial decision.30
Drawing an analogy between the facts in these studies and those presented in
the legal process, he characterized relevant case facts as "stimuli." 31 Schubert
sought to scale these stimuli according to their relative ideological values. He
then scaled in the same graph, or "multi-dimensional ideological space," the
relative ideological position of a justice-a key assumption underlying his
27 See GLENDN ScHUBERT, Ta JuDci MIN: Tam ATnTmus AND IDEOLOGiEs oF
SUPRmE CouRT JusIcEs, 1946-1963, at 6 (1965).
28 See id.
29 See id. at 4 (likening his effort to Alice's step through the Looking Glass).
30 See id. at 22-37.
3 1 See id.
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model being that justices and cases could be ideologically scaled relative to one
another. 32
To understand Schubert's theory, consider a simple model on a horizontal
line, or a "one-dimensional ideological space." We can locate case stimuli at
relative points, which Schubert called "j-points," along an ideological line. 33
We also place justices based upon their relative attitudes along the same
ideological line at points Schubert called "ideal points" or "i-points. " 34
The following hypothetical illustrates Schubert's theory.35 An appellate
court is presented with First Amendment challenges in two cases-case A and
case B-involving injunctions curtailing political demonstrations. In case A, the
district judge found past instances of violence and the potential for future
violence and ordered that demonstrators stand at least five feet away from
entrances and exits at the targeted facility. The district judge in case B found
evidence of prior acts of violence and ordered that the demonstrators stand out
of earshot of (at least 30 feet away from) any person approaching, entering, or
leaving the facility. Under Schubert's theory, we can position these case stimuli
in ideological space. The injunction in case B is more restrictive of speech, so
we place it to the ideological right of case A, as set forth in Figure 1.
32 See id. Schubert developed a multi-dimensional version of his model with scale axes.
He then used empirical evidence in an attempt to map the location of each justice's i-point in
the "orthogonal," or multi-dimensional, ideological space relative to the various case j-points.
(The meaning of i-points and j-points is discussed textually infra.) I do not discuss fully the
multi-dimensional model here because it is more complicated and would consume more space
than is necessary to understand the contribution made by Schubert's work. See id.
33 See id. at 37-38.
34 See id. Professors Segal and Spaeth observe that i-points are more aptly called
indifference points because a judge would be indifferent as between alternative outcomes
when a case stimulus, or j-point, corresponds with her i-point. See JaFFREY A. SEGAL &
HAROLD J. SPA=rH, Tm SUPRE iE COURT AND THE ATrrruDINAL MODEL 68 (1993). Ideal
points, in contrast, would refer to the judge's preferred outcome. The judge's preferred
outcome is not represented by her place on the ideological spectrum relative to case stimuli
but rather by the decision she would make as to each case.
35 The hypothetical is modeled after a hypothetical drawn by Segal and Spaeth. See id. at
67-68. Segal and Spaeth's book, as well as their respective book chapters in Lee Epstein's
Contemplating Courts, were invaluable sources of information and insight on the theoretical
development and construction of the attitudinal model. See id.; Segal et al., Decisionmald'ng,
supra note 7, at 227; Harold J. Spaeth, The Attitudinal Model, in CONT LATING CouRTs
296 (Lee Epstein ed., 1995) [hereinafter Spaeth, Attitudinal Mode].
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Figure 1. Hypothetical case stimuli (-points) in
one-dimensional ideological space
A B
< I I >
We would be able to place any demonstration injunction along this line
depending on its characteristics, or stimuli. The more restrictive the injunction
and the less evidence of harm to support it, the farther to the right the
corresponding j-point will be. And the j-point will be farther to the left the less
restrictive the injunction and the more evidence to support it.
Next we imagine three appellate judges with different attitudes on the
question of demonstration injunctions. Judge 1 believes that any injunction is an
unconstitutional prior restraint. Judge 3 believes that trial judges should actively
exercise their power to limit demonstrations to maintain order and would
uphold most injunctions. Judge 2 desires to provide some right to communicate
while protecting persons at risk from demonstrations; she is not as deferential to
trial judges as Judge 3 and not as opposed to injunctions as Judge 1.
We can place these three judges at i-points along the same ideological line
containing our hypothetical case stimuli, as set forth in Figure 2.
Figure 2. Hypothetical judicial attitudes (i-points)
in one-dimensional ideological space
1 A 2 B 3
< II I II I II
In this one-dimensional model, the judge upholds injunctions to the left of
her position and strikes those to the right.36 A three-judge panel consisting of
Judges 1, 2, and 3 would affirm the injunction in case A by a two-judge vote of
36 The Schubert model, as represented in one-dimensional space, does not account for
the nature of the protest. Consequently, union protestors' free speech claims would produce
the same case stimuli as the same claims by anti-abortion protestors. An empirical test of such
a model would likely reveal that the nature of the protest does affect the judge's response. A
multi-dimensional representation would take account of such a variation.
[Vol. 58:16351648
DEVELOPING A POSITIVE THEORY
Judges 2 and 3 but would vacate the injunction in case B by a two-judge
majority of Judges 1 and 2.
2. Rohde-Spaeth
A decade later, David Rohde and Harold Spaeth agreed with Schubert's
evaluation of the nature of the judicial process, but they proposed a different
attitudinal model based on the categorization of "attitude objects" and "attitude
situations." 37 The Rohde-Spaeth model hypothesizes that individual preference
is the primary determinant of judicial behavior. Preferences, in turn, are
composed primarily of "attitudes." '38 Borrowing psychologist Milton Rokeach's
definition, Professors Rohde and Spaeth submitted that:
An attitude is a (1) relatively enduring, (2) organization of interrelated beliefs
that describe, evaluate, and advocate action with respect to an object or
situation, (3) with each belief having cognitive, affective, and behavioral
components. (4) Each one of these beliefs is a predisposition that, when
suitably activated, results in some preferential response for the attitude object
or situation, or toward the maintenance or preservation of the attitude itself. (5)
Since an attitude object must always be encountered within some situation
about which we also have an attitude, a minimum condition for social behavior
is the activation of at least two interacting attitudes, one concerning the attitude
object and the other concerning the attitude situation.39
In fact, Rohde and Spaeth observed that goals, rules, and situations
influence decisions and outcomes generally.40 The primary goals of justices are
"policy goals: ... [e]ach member of the [Supreme] Court has preferences
concerning the policy questions faced by the Court, and when the justices make
decisions they want the outcomes to approximate as nearly as possible those
policy preferences."41 The ability of justices to obtain their goals is aided by life
tenure, which gives the justices job security and removes ambition for higher
office, and by supremacy in the judicial system, which accords finality to their
decisions. 42
As Professor Spaeth would explain more specifically nearly twenty years
37 See DAVID W. ROHDE & HAROLD J. SPAET, SUPREME COURT DECISION MAKING
(1976).
38 See id. at 75.
39 Id. (quoting Milton Rokeach, The Nature of Attitudes, in 1 TmTNA-nONAL
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 449-57 (1968)) (emphasis added).
40 See id. at 71-72.
4 1 Id. at 72.
42 See id. at 72-74.
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later, "[c]entral to the Rohde-Spaeth formulation is the construct of attitudes,
which [we] define as a set of interrelated beliefs about at least one attitude
object [AO] and the situation in which it is encountered [attitude situation, or
AS]." 43 In the context of judicial decisions, the attitude objects (AOs) are
conceptualized as the "legal or human persons involved in the legal process,"
and the attitude situations (ASs) are the "dominant legal issues" presented.44 In
a case involving a corporation suing a federal agency over a wage and hour
law, for example, a justice's vote will tm on the interaction between the
justice's attitudes toward business and government (AOs) and her attitudes
toward economic regulation and employee protection (ASs).45
3. Operationalizing "Attitude": Party of Appointing President
Other social scientists have taken the extant theoretical premise of the
Schubert and Rohde-Spaeth models-that justices decide cases based on
attitudes-and continued their work of developing a model. The first task faced
by these social scientists was to operationalize judicial attitudes. Because few
judges have publicly stated their ideological preferences on every issue, social
scientists have been forced to use some sort of proxy for judicial attitude.46
They have sought to estimate unobservable personal values or ideology by
relying on observable attributes which have been linked with individual
preferences and beliefs, such as age, gender, race, party identification, and
religious, regional, and ethnic background. 47 But these studies have had limited
SUCCeSS. 4
8
43 Spaeth, Attitudinal Model, supra note 35, at 307.
44 ROHDE & SPATI, supra note 37, at 77.
45 See id. at 77-78, 161-67 (including a table containing the actual cases and their
corresponding AO and AS values).
46 For a discussion of the challenges to formulating measures of individual
preference, see Lee Epstein & Carol Mershon, Measuring Political Preferences, 40 AM.
J. POL. ScI. 261, 261-62 (1996) ("Perhaps the most fundamental challenge is to locate
sources of data that are independent of the behavior of the political actors under
scrutiny.").
47 For example, Beverly Blair Cook sought to explain the severity of sentences given to
draft offenders by federal district judges. She considered the effects of various characteristics
of a judge on the judge's decision, including: age (whether the judge was over the age of 65),
military service (none, low, or high), having a son (or sons) of draftable age, membership in
local versus national versus altruistic groups, association with civil liberties groups, and party
identification. She was able to explain only 5% of the variation in the sample of 1852 draft
cases. See Beverly Blair Cook, Sentencing Behavior of Federal Judges: Draft Cases-1972,
42 U. CINN. L. REV. 597, 620-30 (1973) (and articles and books cited therein).
For another example, see Sue Davis et al., Voting Behavior and Gender on the U.S.
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As it turns out, social scientists have discovered that the political party of
the appointing President is a good proxy for a justice's attitudes. 4 9 This is
hardly surprising, because the appointment process is highly political:
Presidents, recognizing the policymaking role of justices, seek to appoint
justices whose politics most closely resemble their own. 50 Various justices have
Courts of Appeals, 77 JUDICATuRE 276 (1995). When they controlled for political
identification, Professors Davis, Susan Hake, and Donald Songer found that Democratic
women sided with employees in employment discrimination cases more often than
Democratic men, but that Republicans did not behave differently based on gender. In search
and seizure cases as well as obscenity cases, there were no statistically significant differences
in the votes of male and female judges once a control for the appointing President's party was
added. See id.; see also Epstein & Mershon, supra note 46.
In addition, Professors Jeffrey Segal and Albert Cover postulated that the attitudes of
justices could be determined from newspaper editorials published about the justice after the
justice's nomination by the President and before the justice's confirmation by the Senate.
They analyzed the content of editorials published regarding the nomination of all justices from
Earl Warren to Anthony Kennedy. If the editorial attributed conservative qualities to the
justice, they counted that as evidence of conservatism, and so forth. They found a high
correlation between the political ideology assigned to statements regarding the justices as
candidates and the ideology of the decisions of those justices once on the Court. They
observed, however, that this measure of attitude might be difficult to replicate. See Jeffrey A.
Segal & Albert D. Cover, Ideological Values and the Votes of U.S. Supreme Court Justices,
83 AM. POL. Sci. Rv. 557 (1989); see also C. Neal Tate, Personal Attribute Models of
Voting Behavior of U.S. Supreme Court Justices: Liberalism in Civil Liberties and Economic
Decisions, 1946-1978, 75 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 355 (1981).
For criticism of attempts to use social background characteristics as a stand-in for
attitudes, see Sheldon Goldman & Austin Sarat, Backgrounds and Decisions, in AMmiUCAN
COURT SYsTsfs 374 (Sheldon Goldman & Austin Sarat eds., 1978); S. Sidney Ulmer, Are
Social Background Models Time-Bound?, 80 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 957, 964-66 (1986).
48 But see Epstein & Mershon, supra note 46; Segal & Cover, supra note 47.
4 9 See, e.g., STUART S. NAGEL, THE LEGAL PROCESS FROM A BmAVIORAL
PmSPECTIVE 188-91 (1969); JOHN SPRAGUE, VOTING PATrERNS OF THE UNITED STATES
SuPREzME COURT: CASES IN FEDERA.sM 1889-1959 (1968) (examining voting blocs using
algorithm and pairing justices who vote together); Tracey E. George & Lee Epstein, On the
Nature of Supreme Court Decision Making, 86 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 323, 326, 328 (1992);
Stuart S. Nagel, Political Party Affiliation and Judges' Decisions, 55 AM. POL. Sci. REv.
843, 845 (1961).
50 See HERMAN SCHWARTZ, PACKING THE COURTS: THE CONSERVATIVE CAMPAIGN TO
REwRrm TE CONsrrrTUTION 42-149 (1988) (providing a brief historical account of judicial
selection from 1793 through 1980, and a more detailed consideration of Ronald Reagan's
successful and failed nominations to the bench, and noting that Reagan was certainly not
unique in his effort to alter the constitutional landscape through judicial appointments); SEGAL
& SPAETH, supra note 34, at 127 ("Given the Supreme Court's role as a national policy
maker, it would boggle the mind if Presidents did not pay careful attention to the ideology and
partisanship of potential nominees."); Sheldon Goldman, The Bush Imprint on the Judiciary:
Carrying on a Tradition, 74 JUDICATURE 294, 295-97, 306 (1991) (discussing how Presidents
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reported being questioned at length by administration officials, and in some
instances by the President himself, about their positions on various policy
issues. 51 Judicial selection thus is inherently political and not strictly merit-
based: "Merit competes with other political considerations like personal and
ideological compatibility, with the forces of support or opposition in Congress
and the White House, and with demands for representative appointments on the
basis of geography, religion, race, gender, and ethnicity."5 2 In turn, the
appointment process results in the appointment of justices whose decisions tend
to be in line with the ideology of the President who selects them.53 The
exceptions are memorable for their unusualness and do not undermine the
postulate that, on average, judges reflect the ideological positions of the
President who appoints them.54 We know further that the President's party
identification reflects overarching, general principles such that a Democratic
President is more liberal than a Republican President.55
The conclusion that judicial behavior can be explained by policy
preferences and predicted by using the party of the appointing President as a
measure of preference should not be misconstrued to imply that justices lack
respect for the rule of law or vote the party line in the way elected officials do.
Reagan and Bush sought to appoint judges to carry out their social agenda, namely,
"institutionalizing judicial restraint in matters of governmental civil liberties and civil rights
policymaking," just as Presidents Roosevelt and Truman aimed to appoint judges to
"comtitutionaliz[e] the New Deal").
51 See, e.g., LAWRENCE BAUM, Tim SuPREME CouRT 42 (4th ed. 1992) (describing how
Justices Harry Blackimun and Sandra Day O'Connor were questioned at length as to their
positions on various policy issues by presidential aides prior to nomination, and how Justice
O'Connor noted that President Reagan personally asked her position on abortion).
52 DAVID M. O'BIEN, STORM CENm: THE SUPREmE COURT iN AMECAN PoLmcs
63 (2d ed. 1990).
53 See, e.g., id.; BAUM, supra note 51, at 41-43; see also John Hart Ely, Another Such
Victory: Constitutional Theory and Practice in a World Where Courts Are No Different from
Legislatures, 77 VA. L. Rnv. 833, 846 (1991) (observing the conflation of law and politics in
the selection of judges); Mark Tushnet, Does Constittional Theory Matter?: A Comment, 65
TEX. L. REv. 777, 780 (1987) ("One can imagine that people could have views on the merits
of political issues... that contradict their views of the constitutional aspects of the same
question. But the people who position themselves to be nominated for federal judgeships are
not part of that imagined group.").
54 See McNollgast, supra note 7, at 1637-38.
5 5 See PMEER WOLL, CONSnTtmONAL DEMOCRACY: PoLIcIEs AND PoLrTcs 153-67
(1982) (discussing from a historical perspective the relationship between political parties and
the identification of and position taken on public policy issues as well as the role of the
President as an embodiment of his party's policy positions).
1652 [Vol. 58:1635
DEVELOPINGA POSITIVE THEORY
Yet justices remain policymakers, 56 and the same factors that lead a justice to
identify with a particular political party and lead a President to select a justice
also lead to more or less liberal decisions by the justice because of his
attitudes. 57
Yet the lingering sense that justices, while seeking to maximize their policy
preferences, are different from other political actors has prompted attempts to
consider more directly the influence of "the law." Lee Epstein and I built on the
attitudinal model by creating a macro-level model that considered both
extralegal factors, such as the composition of the Court (measured by the
number of Republican appointees), and legal factors, such as the legally
relevant facts presented to the Court in a particular case. 58 We tested our theory
through an empirical consideration of death penalty cases decided by the
Supreme Court between 1972 and 1991. We found that an integrated model
accounted for the Court's rulings better than a strictly attitudinal model. We
concluded that doctrine acted as a constraint on the impact of non-legal forces
on Supreme Court decisionmaking and that "the most complete explanation of
judicial outcomes should incorporate legal and extralegal factors." 59 However,
the inherent impediments to the creation of a functional model of this form
across doctrinal areas have limited other efforts to similarly map judicial
outcomes.60
The attitudinal model endures because empirical studies have demonstrated
that it has substantial explanatory power. 61 As Epstein and Jack Knight have
56 See, e.g., WALTER F. MURPHY, ELEMENTS OF JUDICIAL STRATEGY 1 (1964) ("As
long as law remains one of the most common means of formalizing public policy, the judicial
office in the United States will involve political, i.e., policy-making, power... and [judges
use that power], as J. W. Peltason has said, 'not as a matter of choice, but of function.'")
(citation omitted); Robert A. Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as
a National Policy-Maker, 6 J. PUB. L. 279, 279-95 (1957).
57 See, e.g., GLENDoN SCHUBERT, QUANITrATrv ANALYSIS OF JuDIcAL BEHAVIOR
129-42 (1959); Goldman, supra note 50; see also supra text accompanying notes 50-51.
58 See George & Epstein, supra note 49.
5 9 Id. at 333-34.
60 Few scholars have presented research demonstrating success with the legal model,
and only a small number of subject areas have been tested. See SEGAL & SPAEM, supra note
34, at 221 n.61 (citing attempts to test an integrated model in other issue areas).
61 See James Gibson, Decision Making in Appellate Courts, in THE AMEMUCAN COURTS:
A CRITICAL AsSESSMET 255, 255-56, 258-60 (John B. Gates & Charles A. Johnson eds.,
1991). Professor Gibson notes:
Political scientists have been systematically studying decision making within the United
States Supreme Court and other appellate courts since the publication of C. Herman
Pritchett's The Roosevelt Court in 1948. Indeed the central problem in the study of
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observed, "judicial specialists generally agree that justices, first and foremost,
wish to see their policy preferences etched into law. They are, in the opinion of
many, 'single-minded seekers of legal policy."' 62 Most adherents of the model
will concede that it does not account for all factors in judicial decisionmaldng63
and acknowledge that legal rules and doctrines have been demonstrated to
restrain and, in some instances, guide decisionmaking. 64 But they point out that
the attitudinal model of judicial decisionmaking is a valuable tool for explaining
and predicting judicial behavior.65
judicial behavior and process over the course of the last fifty years has been to
understand the processes through which decisions are made by the judges sitting on
appellate benches .... Despite the difficulties of collecting data, great strides have been
made in developing theories and models of the decision-making process within appellate
courts. Even with the cloak of secrecy, analysts have been able to penetrate these courts,
largely through statistical methods. This has produced a series of strong hunches about
how decisions get made.
Id. at 258-60; see also George & Epstein, supra note 49, at 325-26. See generally SEGAL &
SPAEm, supra note 34, and sources cited therein.
62 EPsrT & KNIGHT, CHIoicEs, supra note 7, at 9-10 (quoting George & Epstein,
supra note 49, at 325).
63 In fact, models are inherently incomplete:
A model is a simplified representation of reality; it does not constitute reality itself.
Models purposefully ignore certain aspects of reality and focus instead on a selected set
of crucial factors. Such simplifications give us a useful handle for understanding the real
world that we could not obtain from more exhaustive and descriptive strategies.
Segal et al., Decisionmaling, supra note 7, at 229; see also supra note 8.
64 See, e.g., George & Epstein, supra note 49, at 328.
6 5 Despite widespread agreement among social scientists that the attitudinal model has a
tremendous amount of explanatory power, most contemporary legal scholars have failed to
acknowledge this work or, when acknowledging it, to give it credence. See, e.g., Michael E.
Solimine, Ideology and En Banc Review, 67 N.C. L. REv. 29, 44-46 (1988) (noting that
social scientists have studied the influence of non-legal factors on legal decisionmaking, but
reaching the astonishing conclusion that it is overemphasized by legal realists). Although
some legal scholars (such as legal realists) have acknowledged the contribution of political
science's insights to the judicial process, see, e.g., LAURA KAIMAN, LEGAL REAUSM AT
YALE, 1927-1960, at 18 (1986); JOHN HENRY SCHLEGEL, AMERICAN LEGAL REAUSM AND
EMPIRICAL SoCIAL SCaENCE (1995) (describing movement to infuse study of law with
understanding of social sciences); ROBERT STEVENS, LAw SCHOOL: LEGAL EDUCATION IN
AMERICA FROM THE 1850s TO THE 1980s (1983), most have ignored what political theorists of
their time were saying about judicial institutions; see, e.g., HART& SACus, supra note 19.
A recent and noteworthy exception to this trend is Tulane Law Professor Stephen
Griffin. See STrmN M. GRIFI, AmERCAN CONSTIrONAUSM: FROM THEORY TO
PoiICs (1996). He attempts to integrate law and political science in the consideration of
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Although the attitudinal model is a good predictor of individual judicial
behavior, public choice scholars now argue that the model can be improved
without unnecessarily complicating it or detracting from its predictive ability.
As discussed in the next section, a small but growing number of judicial
theorists are proposing that a model of judicial behavior must account for the
fact that Supreme Court justices make decisions as members of a multi-judge
court and as a part of a political system.
III. THE INTRODUCTION OF A STRATEGIC THEORY OF
JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR
Attitudinal theorists contend that a Supreme Court justice's decisions on the
merits of a case are the product of legal policy preferences and case facts. A
Republican appointee will tend to take a more conservative position than a
Democratic appointee; she will do so regardless of the positions taken by her
colleagues on the bench or by other institutions. But the attitudinal model is
incomplete. It does not account for a fundamental characteristic of the Supreme
Court: the decisions of individual justices are subject to the agreement of other
justices on the Court as well as the acquiescence of institutions higher up in the
decisionmaking hierarchy. Recently, judicial scholars have proposed theories
that recognize the interdependence of judicial decisionmaking. These
"strategic" theories of judicial behavior, which I discuss below, acknowledge
that justices seek to satisfy policy goals but emphasize the influence, or effects,
of strategic factors, such as interactions with colleagues on the Court (internal
dynamics) 66 and reactions to the positions of other institutional actors (external
constitutional theory. Id. at 131-39. He observes that although political scientists who work in
the field often consider legal scholarship, "legal scholars do not often return the favor" and
that "[clonstitutional theories offered by legal scholars rarely ... discuss behaviorist research
on judicial decisionmaking." Id. at ix-x.
66 Scholars, such as Lewis Komhauser and Lawrence Sager, David Post and Steven
Salop, and Maxwell Steams, have utilized strategic and/or rational choice modeling to
evaluate normative adjudication theories in light of internal dynamics presumed to exist in
multi-judge appellate courts, specifically the Supreme Court. See, e.g., Lewis A. Komhauser
& Lawrence G. Sager, The One and the Many: Adjudication in Collegial Courts, 81 CAL. L.
REV. 1, 4-5 (1993) (discussed infra note 70); David Post & Steven C. Salop, Rowing Against
the Tidewater: A Theory of Voting by Multijudge Panels, 80 GEo. L.J. 743, 770-74 (1992)
(arguing that multi-judge courts should adopt a system of "issue voting" as opposed to the
present "outcome voting" approach); Maxwell L. Steams, The Misguided Renaissance of
Social Choice, 103 YAE L.J. 1219, 1257-87 (1994). For a thoughtful consideration and
critique of this scholarship, see John M. Rogers, "Issue Voting" by Muldtinember Appellate
Courts: A Response to Some Radical Proposals, 49 VAND. L. REv. 997, 997-1040 (1996).
Professor Steams and Professors Post and Salop are given an opportunity to reply in this
Vanderbilt Law Review symposium. See David G. Post & Steven C. Salop, Issues and
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forces), and of institutional structure on the justices' final decisions.67
To illustrate the general distinction between the attitudinal model and a
strategic model which considers the effects of external forces on judicial
decisionmaking, imagine a hypothetical justice-Justice X-faced with three
possible outcomes in a particular case-i, 2, or 3. Imagine further that Justice
X prefers outcome 1 to outcome 2 and outcome 2 to outcome 3.68 If the Court
reaches outcome 1, Congress will pass legislation to overrule the Court's
decision and enact outcome 3. In contrast, Congress will not pass legislation in
response to outcome 2, even though it prefers outcome 3. While the attitudinal
model predicts that Justice X will vote for his most preferred outcome, outcome
1, the strategic model assumes that Justice X recognizes that his ability to obtain
his policy goals is dependent upon the actions of other political institutions.
Accordingly, the strategic model predicts that Justice X will vote for outcome 2
because he prefers it to outcome 3 (the final result, after congressional action, if
he chooses outcome 1).69
We can alter the example to illustrate the distinction between the attitudinal
model and a strategic model which considers internal dynamics, that is, the
influence of other Court actors on Justice X's decision. Assume that a majority
of justices, including Justice X, will vote for outcome 2, but that the failure of
majority support for outcome 2 (which occurs when Justice X votes for
outcome 1) results in a shift in support such that a majority of justices votes for
outcome 3. (Perhaps Justice Y is indifferent between outcomes 2 and 3, and
Outcomes, Guidance, and Indeterminacy: A Reply to Professor John Rogers and Others, 49
VAND. L. REv. 1069 (1996); Maxwell L. Stearns, How Outcome Voting Promotes Principled
Issue Identification: A Reply to Professor John Rogers and Others, 49 VAND. L. REv. 1045
(1996).
67 See EpSrEIN & KNiGHT, CHoIcES, supra note 7, at 10-18.
68 This example is modeled after a hypothetical drawn by Professor Epstein:
In rational choice models of judicial decisions, thus, it is not enough to say, as the
attitudinal model does, that Justice X chose action 1 over 2 because she preferred 1 to 2.
Rather the strategic.assumption suggests the following proposition: Justice X chose 1
because X believed the other relevant actors-perhaps Justice Y or Senator Z-would
choose 2, 3, or another action, and given these choices, action 1 led to a better outcome
for Justice X than did other alternative actions.
Epstein, supra note 9, at 13 n.4 (citing PErER C. ORDEsHOoK, A PoLmCAL THEORY PRMER
8 (1992)).
69 The strategic model can be just as rigid in its prediction as the attitudinal model. It
predicts that Justice X will usually not vote for her most preferred outcome while the
attitudinal model insists she will. Cf. EPSTEIN & KNIGHT, CHiOcES, supra note 7, at 5
(describing circumstance in which "strategic calculations will lead justices to vote their
sincere preferences or sign opinions that reflect them").
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prefers both to outcome 1.) Justice X will vote for outcome 2 to prevent a
majority from forming in support of outcome 3.
In this section, I discuss the theories that have developed to consider and
explain the phenomena set forth in these two examples; that is, the behavior of
goal-oriented justices who are dependent upon other justices and other
institutions for the realization of their policy goals. First, I delineate and explain
the studies of internal dynamics on the Court, which tell us that justices within a
group may forego their sincere policy preferences in favor of other goals, such
as influence on the content of the majority opinion, participation on the winning
side, or position as a pivotal voter. Second, I consider separation of powers
studies of external forces on the Court.
A. Internal Dynamics
Federal appellate courts are collegial and decide cases collectively.70 A
justice must consider and respond to the preferences and expected actions of her
colleagues to attain the outcome closest to her own initial preference. The
necessary process of bargaining, compromise, and accommodation makes it
unlikely that a justice will be able to reach a decision that exactly reflects her
ideal outcome in every case, or even in most cases. 71
Political scientist Walter Murphy was one of the first social scientists to
consider the fact that Supreme Court justices act collectively rather than
individually. 72 In his landmark book, The Elements of Judicial Strategy,
Murphy built on small group sociology theory to develop a theory of justices as
70 See Komhauser & Sager, supra note 3 (noting that appellate adjudication in the
United States is exclusively a group process, and arguing that the group nature must be taken
into account when developing theories of adjudication); Komhauser & Sager, supra note 66,
at 4 (explaining that "appellate adjudication is a collective endeavor that can only be fully
understood once its collective features are considered," and that in "[c]ollegial collective
enterprises ... each participant must consider and respond to her colleagues as she performs
her tasks [because] collaboration and deliberation are the trademarks of collegial enterprise").
In these two articles addressing the doctrinal paradox posed by multi-judge courts, the authors
consider a normative query not addressed by my empirical evaluation: namely, whether
models of adjudication satisfy the goals of adjudication given the current structure of the
appellate process (specifically that it involves multiple decisionmakers).
71 Justice Frankfurter explained the experience: "When you have to have at least five
people to agree on something, they can't have that comprehensive completeness of candor
which is open to a single man, giving his own reasons untrammeled by what anybody else
may do or not do if he put that out." FAux FRANKFuRTER, Faux FRA nFuRTER REm CES
294-301 (Harlan B. Phillips ed., 1960).
72 See MuIRmY, supra note 56. Sociologist Eloise Snyder published an earlier evaluation
of the implications of small group theory for Supreme Court decisionmaking. See also Eloise
Snyder, The Supreme Court as Small Group, 36 Soc. FoRcEs 232 (1958).
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strategic actors within a collective body. 73 He described how a justice could act
to maximize influence on public policy development through a process of
bargaining. His approach was largely descriptive, providing historical evidence
to support the theory that justices brought together to decide cases act like other
persons forced to interact to reach a group decision, that is, their positions are
influenced by the presence of others. This influence will produce different
strategic behavior in different actors, but its effect undermines the argument that
justices will vote solely based on their attitudes (as proffered by the attitudinal
model).
Scholars have built on Murphy's work by utilizing rational choice, or
public choice, theory to develop a model of strategic interaction within the
Court.74 "Unlike the attitudinal model, the strategic model suggests that
73 For examples of small group sociology studies of the time, see MURPHY, supra note
56, at 216 n.1, and sources cited therein.
74 The most noteworthy scholarly contribution following Murphy's approach and
utilizing public choice theory is a book published this year by Epstein and Knight entitled The
Choices Justices Make. See EPsTEIN & KNIGHT, CHOICES, supra note 7. Some scholars refer
to the application of the methods of economics to the study of politics as "rational choice
theory." See, e.g., Peter C. Ordeshook, The Development of Contemporary Political Theory,
in POLITICAL ECONOMY: INSTtrrIONs, COMPETITION, AND REPRESENTATION 73 (William
A. Barnett et al., eds., 1993); William H. Riker, Political Science and Rational Choice, in
PERSPECnvEs ON PosrIvE PourcAL ECONOMY 163 (James E. Alt & Kenneth A. Shepsle
eds., 1990). Others, however, refer to it as "public choice theory." See, e.g., DENNIS C.
MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE (1979). Regardless of label, rational/public choice theory is a
variant of game theory.
Game theory is a mathematical theory of rational competitive and cooperative behavior
which has its origins in Jon von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstem's classic 1944 text Theory
of Games and Economic Behavior. JOHN VON NEUMANN & OSKAR MORGENSTERN, THEORY
OF GAMEs AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR (1944). The political and economic theories derived
from game theory have been some of the most intriguing, and hotly debated, theories
developed in the social scientific and legal literature.
Judicial scholars have been slow to examine the implications of game theoretic models-
arguably the most significant development in political theory in recent years-for theories of
judicial behavior. See John B. Gates, Theory, Methods, and the New Institutionalism in
Judicial Research, in THE AMERICAN COURTS: A CRmcAL AssEss=mT 469, 473 (John B.
Gates & Charles A. Johnson eds., 1991) (arguing that notwithstanding a few noteworthy
studies considering rational/public choice theory in the context of law and courts, "researchers
in judicial politics seem much less attentive to the potential strengths and weaknesses of these
perspectives"). Epstein and Knight have explicitly attempted to build on the work of Murphy
with their new book The Choices Justices Make. See EPSTEIN & KNIGHT, CHOICES, supra
note 7.
Not all social scientists believe that variants of game theory, such as rational or public
choice, offer great insight to political and economic phenomena. Some critics complain that
rational choice models lack sufficient empirical support to justify their burgeoning use. See,
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Supreme Court justices are constrained by the behavior of their brethren or
actors external to the Court."75 The strategic model is also dynamic where the
attitudinal model is static; the former seeks to explain not merely a justice's
final vote on the merits of a case, but also her participation in a deliberative
process within which justices cast initial votes in conference, circulate draft
opinions, propose or demand changes in drafts, change votes, circulate revised
drafts, and conclude by authoring or signing onto a majority, concurring, or
dissenting opinion.
Strategy theorists such as political scientists Epstein and Knight have argued
persuasively that "[w]e can best explain the choices of justices as strategic
behavior, and not merely as responses to ideological values. "76 Recent research
on the interaction between Supreme Court justices suggests and documents
various forms of strategic behavior during the deliberative process, including
the exchange of a vote for changes in opinion content and the move from the
minority position in a case to the majority in order to retain authority (or
perhaps simply to avoid loss of status).
1. Opinion Writing and Signing Negotiations
Murphy revealed, based on an examination of the papers of Justices
Murphy, Stone, and Taft, the intra-Court bargaining wherein a justice offers to
trade his vote and concurrence in an opinion for changes in the content of the
opinion.77 Recently, political scientists Maltznan and Wahlbeck, after an
extensive examination of intra-Court correspondence and conference records
contained in Justice Brennan's personal papers, discovered many modem
incidents of justices voting against their ideal policy positions in order to
e.g., DONALD P. GREEN & IAN SHaImO, PATHOLOGIES OF RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY
(1994).
It is beyond the scope of the present article to parse the various arguments regarding
rational choice theory or even to provide a full exposition of what rational choice theory is.
Accordingly, I seek to discuss in a fairly simple manner the elements and characteristics of
game theory relevant to my proposed model of en bane circuit court decisionmaking.
75 James F. Spriggs, I et al., The Process of Bargaining and Accommodation on the
U.S. Supreme Court (Apr. 10-12, 1997) (unpublished paper, presented at the 1997 annual
meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago) (on file with author).
76 See Lee Epstein & Jack Knight, The New Institutionalism, Part II, LAw & COURTS,
Spring 1997, at 4. (setting forth a synopsis of their work which is more fully developed in
their recently published book, The Choices Justices Make).
7 7 See MuRPHY, supra note 56, at 56-68 (recounting several exchanges between justices
supporting his hypothesis that justices trade votes for language in the majority opinion).
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influence the content of a majority opinion.78 Consider Maltzman and
Wahlbeck's recounting of a post-conference yet pre-decision exchange
regarding Wardius v. Oregon,79 a case in which the Supreme Court ultimately
reversed the lower court and recognized a criminal defendant's right to
reciprocal discovery:
Justice Brennan's docket books reveal that Justice Rehnquist initially voted with
the minority. Nevertheless, on March 14, 1973, he circulated an explanatory
note: "I voted to affirm in this case at Conference, but before writing a dissent
to Thurgood's proposed opinion I think I will wait to see if anything
narrower... is written." On June 4, Justice Marshall circulated a new draft
with a cover letter stating that "since the Court appears hopelessly splintered on
the disposition of petitioner's [Wardius] contentions concerning the state's
exclusionary rule, I have decided that it may be best to leave this question for
another day." On June 6, Marshall's decision to limit the breadth of his opinion
was rewarded when Rehnquist joined his opinion to reverse.80
After discovering such historical evidence of opinion writing and signing
negotiations,81 Mallzman and Wahlbeck sought to test systematically Murphy's
78 See Maltzman & Wahlbeck, supra note 7. For an interesting account of the justices'
thoughts about and some historical instances of opinion writing and signing negotiations, see
Spriggs et al., supra note 75 (quoting from the personal papers of justices).
Recent studies have been made possible by the availability of the personal papers of
various justices, most notably Justices Brennan and Marshall. Justice Brennan's papers
include records of conference votes and changes in votes over the course of opinion
circulation and revision. For a discussion of these documents, see Forrest Maltzman & Paul
J. Wahlbeck, Inside the U.S. Supreme Court: The Reliability of the Justices' Conference
Records, 58 J. POL. 528, 528-39 (1996).
79 412 U.S. 470 (1973).
80 Maltzma & Wahlbeek, supra note 7, at 583 (quoting Memorandum from William
Rehnquist to Warren Burger (Mar. 14, 1973) and Memorandum from Thurgood Marshall to
the Conference (June 4, 1973) (available in William J. Brennan's Papers, Box 303, Library of
Congress)).
81 One example of a more direct request by a justice to trade his vote for a change in
opinion content is Justice Potter Stewart's communication to Justice Hugo Black in which
Stewart threatened to join Justice John Harlan's dissent instead of signing onto Black's
majority opinion:
"At the risk of seeming unreasonably stubborn, I am still unwilling to join your opinion
so long as it contains the view expressed in the phrase 'over a long period of time' in the
6th line on page 12. Perhaps I had better wait to see John Harlan's separate opinion."
Maltzman & Wahlbeck, supra note 7, at 581 (quoting Memorandum from Potter Stewart to
Hugo Black (Dec. 2, 1969) (available in William J. Brennan's Papers, Box 205, Library of
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hypothesis that "the key resource that policy-minded justices have at their
disposal is their vote and opinion-and these can be used as bargaining chips to
affect the content of the Court's opinion." 82 They looked at changes in votes
between the original conference on the merits and the Court's announcement of
the final decision (known as "voting fluidity") reflected in Justice Brennan's
conference notes and proposed a strategic model of voting fluidity to explain all
discovered vote shifts.83 Using a statistical tool called logistic regression 84 to
examine votes on the Burger Court, they demonstrated that justices' decisions
to change their votes stemmed primarily from strategic considerations rather
than a change in their underlying policy positions. 85 More specifically, justices
change their votes not because they are persuaded by the other side but rather
to retain what influence they can given a losing position.
2. Swing Justices: Loss Aversion and Status Seeking
The social psychology literature provides some illumination upon the
reasons why a justice joins a majority which takes a position inconsistent with
her sincere policy preferences. Justices may cast a vote contrary to their
ideological position because they like to win (or to be perceived as "winners"),
or perhaps because they are loss averse.86 They simply may prefer to be in the
Congress)) (explaining that "[u]ltimately, Black altered the draft opinion, and Stewart switched
from the position he first expressed at conference and joined Black's opinion").
82 See Maltzman & Wahlbeck, supra note 7, at 581.
83 Id.
84 Logistic regression, unlike linear regression, assumes a dependent variable (the event
to be explained) that is dichotomous (has two possible values), and therefore is better suited
than traditional linear regression for analyzing judicial decisions which, like many political
variables, are dichotomous. See generally ALAN AGREsTI & BARBARA FINLAY, STATSTICAL
MEmODs FOR rim SOcIAL ScIENc s 482-92 (2d ed. 1986) (describing logistic and logit
models); JOHN H. ALDRICH & FoRRESr D. NELSON, LINEAR PROBABILITY, LoGrr, AND
PRoBrr MODELS 48-66 (1984). For a more detailed discussion of logistic regression and logit,
see infra notes 147-51 and accompanying text.
85 See Maltzman & Wahlbeck, supra note 7, at 587-90.
86 The phenomenon of loss aversion in the instance of a riskless choice (i.e., a choice
without uncertainty) is well documented in the psychological literature, though it has not been
examined in the specific setting of judicial decisionmaking. See, e.g., Daniel Kahneman et
al., Anomalies: The Endownent Effect, Loss Aversion, and Status Quo Bias, 5 J. ECON.
PEmsP. 193, 200 (1991) (explaining that "a given difference between two options will have
greater impact if it is viewed as a difference between two disadvantages than if it is viewed as
a difference between two advantages"); Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Loss Aversion
in Riskless Choice: A Reference-Dependent Model, 106 Q.J. ECON. 1039, 1047 (1991) ("The
basic intuition concerning loss aversion is that losses (outcomes below the reference state)
loom larger than corresponding gains (outcomes above the reference state). Because a shift of
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majority: "Justices on the court, like individuals in all institutions, may feel
uncomfortable remaining outside the dominant group. As a result, justices may
change their votes from the minority to the majority because of small-group
influences that are independent of policy preferences."8 7 Justice George
Sutherland, who served on the Court from 1922 to 1938, acceded on a number
of occasions to a majority opinion with which he did not agree rather than
dissent alone. He wrote to Chief Justice Harlan Fiske Stone in 1930 that "'I was
inclined the other way [in Broad River Power Co. v. South Carolina88], but I
think no one agreed with me. I, therefore, yield my not very positive views to
those of the majority.' 89 Similarly, Sutherland told Stone regarding Lamb v.
Schmitt,9° "'I voted the other way, but I have acquiesced in other outrages and
probably shall in this. Shall let you know Saturday, though I should like more
time to forget.' 91 He did acquiesce. Finally, in Alaska Packers Association v.
Industrial Accident Commission,92 Sutherland wrote on the back of Stone's slip
opinion in the case: "'Probably bad-but only a small baby. Let it go.'" 93
Justices may also act as swing justices because they seek status by
establishing themselves as the pivotal vote on the court, shifting between
reference can tam gains into losses and vice versa, it can give rise to reversals of
preference."). I thank Chris Guthrie for suggesting loss aversion as a possible explanation for
the phenomena of judges giving up the opportunity to write a dissent and voting in the
majority even when they continue to disagree with the majority position.
87 See Maltmnan & Wahlbeck, supra note 7, at 583; see also MURPHY, supra note 56,
at 62 ("Most people experience anxiety when they find themselves in sharp disagreement with
a group with whom they are intimately, associated. Supreme Court Justices tend to be highly
independent and individualistic men, but they may not be completely immune to this distaste
for isolation.").
88 281 U.S. 537 (1930).
89 Harlan Fiske Stone Papers, Library of Congress, quoted in MURPHY, supra note 56,
at 52.
90 285 U.S. 222 (1932).
91 Harlan Fiske Stone Papers, Library of Congress, quoted in MURPHY, supra note 56,
at 52.
92 294 U.S. 532 (1935).
93 Harlan Fiske Stone Papers, Library of Congress, quoted in MuRPHY, supra note 56,
at 52-53 (Sutherland's comment about the case's significance also suggests another strategic
motivation: preserving personal capital for when it matters.). Sutherland was not the only
justice on the Court at that time who signed onto an opinion with which he disagreed. Murphy
described a handwritten note by Justice Pierce Butler written on the back of a Stone slip
opinion and filed in Stone's personal papers: "'I voted to reverse. While this sustains your
conclusion to affirm, I still think reversal would be better. But I shall in silence acquiesce.
Dissents seldom aid in the right development or statement of the law. They often do harm.
For myself I say: 'Lead us not into temptation.'" Id. at 52.
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majority, coalitions. 94 These justices may cast the decisive vote in close cases
(e.g., where there is a five-to-four vote split) and thereby appear to have greater
policymaking power.95 In a range of issue areas, Justice Anthony Kennedy
appears to shift between voting blocs in an effort to earn the role of deciding
vote.96 Justice Sandra Day O'Connor has also been considered a pivotal justice,
although within certain, limited issue areas like affirmative action, abortion
rights, and First Amendment Establishment Clause jurisprudence. 97 Scholars
have identified several justices as filling this key position: Hugo Black,98 Tom
Clark,99 Charles Evans Hughes, 100 Lewis Powell, 101 Stanley Reed, 102 Owen
Roberts, 0 3 and Potter Stewart.1 04
94 See, e.g., SCHUBERT, supra note 57, at 192-210 (applying game theory hypothesis
that certain justices will seek to be swing judges to the voting behavior of Chief Justice
Hughes and Justice Roberts); Tracey E. George, Identifying Swing Justices on the U.S.
Supreme Court: The Case of Justice Powell and the Death Penalty (1990) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with author).
95 But it is unclear whether the justice is determining the direction of the law or simply
moving between coalitions. George, supra note 94, at 1-2.
9 6 See, e.g., Marcia Coyle, An Emboldened Majority Breaks Ground, NAT'L L.J., July
31, 1995, at C2-C4 (describing Justices O'Connor and Kennedy as swing justices); Jeffrey
Rosen, The Agonizer, NEW YORKER, Nov. 11, 1996, at 82 (After considering significant
Court decisions during Kennedy's tenure, the author concludes that "a pattern has emerged.
Where Justice Kennedy goes, so goes the Supreme Court: for the past three terms, in 5-4
cases, he has voted with the majority more often than any other Justice, and so has been the
pivotal figure in case after case .... His leadership, it should be said, is passive rather than
active: other Justices must persuade him of their views, rather than the other way around.").
97 See, e.g., Coyle, supra note 96, at C2-C4; George, supra note 94, at 1; Stephen
Wermeil, Swing Vote: Sandra Day O'Connor Emerges as Key Player in High Court Rulings,
WALL ST. J., June 11, 1990, at 1.
98 See J. Woodford Howard, On the Fluidity of Judicial Choice, 62 AM. POL. SCI. REv.
43 (1968). Justice Black served on the Court from 1937 through 1971.
99 See SCHUBERT, supra note 57. Justice Clark served on the Court from 1949 through
1962.
100 See id; SPRAGUE, supra note 49. Justice Hughes served on the Court as an associate
justice from 1910 through 1916 and as chief justice from 1930-1941.
101 See George, supra note 94. Justice Powell served on the Court from 1972-1987.
102 See Note, Mr. Justice Reed: Swing Man or Not?, 1 STAN. L. REV. 714 (1949).
Justice Reed served on the Court from 1938-1957.103 See SCHUBERT, supra note 57; SPRAGUE, supra note 49. Justice Roberts served on
the Court from 1930-1945.
104 See William B. Schultz & Philip K. Howard, The Myth of Swing Voting: An Analysis
of Voting Patterns on the Supreme Court, 50 N.Y.U. L. REv. 798 (1975). Justice Stewart
served on the Court from 1958 through 1991.
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B. External Forces
A strategic, policy-oriented justice considers not only the positions of her
colleagues but also of other actors who can influence policy outcomes. The
Supreme Court's statutory rulings can be and have been overruled by Congress
and the President. Although extremely unlikely, its constitutional rulings can be
overturned by the amendment process.' 0 5 It would be surprising if these
external forces did not influence Supreme Court decisionmaking. A justice truly
seeking to maximize her sincerely-held preferences would want to consider
whether her decision would be overturned by an actor above her in the
hierarchy.
Historically, scholars did not incorporate environmental variables such as
the interrelatedness of the judicial and political subsystems into research
design.106 In recent years, scholars, again relying on game theoretic designs,
have developed formal models of the strategic interplay between the Supreme
Court, Congress, and the President;107 these so-called "separation-of-powers
games," like the internal dynamics strategic model, presume that justices seek
to maximize their personal policy preferences.' 08 But, as Segal explains, the
separation-of-powers games, again like the internal strategic model, emphasize
the role of strategy:
The positive political theorists argue that in order to come as close as possible
to achieving that goal the Court must frequently defer to the preferences of
Congress, especially in statutory interpretation cases. Attitudinalists,
alternatively, argue that the rules and structures of the U.S. political system
105 See EPSTEiN Er AL., supra note 2, at 608 (setting forth in tabular form the four
amendments overturning Supreme Court decisions).
106 See Cook, supra note 47.
107 See, e.g., Lee Epstein & Thomas G. Walker, The Role of the Supreme Court in
American Society: Playing the Reconstruction Game, in CONTEMPLAT'NG Couirs 315 (Lee
Epstein ed., 1995); Eskridge, Overriding, supra note 7; Eskridge, Reneging on History,
supra note 7; Knight & Epstein, Struggle, supra note 7; Brian Marks, A Model of Judicial
Influence on Congressional Policymaking: Grove City College v. Bell (1989) (unpublished
working paper in political science P-88-7, Hoover Institution, Stanford University, on file
with author); Jeffrey A. Segal, Separation-of-Powers Games in the Positive Theory of
Congress and Courts, 91 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 28 (1997). Brian Marks has been given credit
for publishing the most influential work on this topic, see Eskridge, Reneging on History,
supra note 7, at 643 n.195, and for being the "first scholar to have included courts in the
American politics separation-of-powers games," Segal, supra, at 29, with his unpublished
paper made available as a working paper at Stanford's Hoover Institution in 1988 and as a
completed Ph.D. dissertation at Washington University, St. Louis, in 1989.
108 See Epstein & Walker, supra note 107, at 322.
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allow the justices to vote sincerely, that is, without constraints from Congress
and/or the president.109
Empirical studies of Court/Congress/President interactions have found that
the Court is responsive to the preferences of the other branches of government,
particularly Congress. For example, in the statutory interpretation area, the
Court is influenced by the current legislators' preferences, as opposed to the
preferences of those who wrote the law.110 These studies share the feature of
delineating serial interaction between the branches based on individual
responses within a range of preferred outcomes.
IV. APPLYING THEORIES OF SUPREME COURT BEHAVIOR TO U.S.
COURTS OF APPEALS
The attitudinal and strategic theories of judicial behavior described above
have been developed almost entirely through a consideration of the behavior of
U.S. Supreme Court justices. What do studies of the Supreme Court tell us
about behavior on lower courts, in particular, federal courts of appeals? Are
circuit judges as able to follow their personal preferences in deciding cases? Do
they behave in the same strategic fashion as justices? Students of the lower
courts have expressed concern that the models developed in analyzing the
Supreme Court may not be well-suited for other courts.111
In this section, I first discuss the relevant institutional distinctions between
circuit courts and the Supreme Court which have hindered the study of lower
10 9 Segal, supra note 107, at 28 (citations omitted).
110 See Eskridge, Overriding, supra note 7, at 390. Segal challenges this finding with his
own research indicating that justices in statutory cases between 1947 and 1992 largely sought
to attain their personal preferences with only minimal evidence of responsive behavior. See
Segal, supra note 107, at 35-43. But see Andrew D. Martin, Designing Statistical Tests of
Formal Theories: The Separation of Powers and the Supreme Court (1997) (unpublished
paper presented at the 1997 annual meeting of the Law and Society Association, St. Louis,
Mo.) (challenging Segal's conclusion).
11 See Donald R. Songer & Susan Haire, Integrating Alternative Approaches to the
Study of Judicial Voting: Obscenity Cases in the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 36 AM. J. POL. SC.
963, 964 (1992). Professors Songer and Haire explain:
Numerous studies exist that provide insight into behavior on the Supreme Court.
However, models that explain behavior on the Supreme Court may not be appropriate
for understanding judicial behavior in other appellate courts .... As a result of the
scholarly focus on the Supreme Court and the inability accurately to extend models of
Supreme Court behavior, much less is known about the bases of voting on lower courts.
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appellate courts, and argue that we can overcome traditional limitations to the
study of courts of appeals by focusing on en banc decisions, arguably the most
significant and revealing rulings of circuit courts. For the current study, I
consider all en banc rulings of one court of appeals, the Fourth Circuit. In
Subsection B, I explain how I collected the relevant information from the 274
en bane cases (my "data") and present basic descriptive statistics regarding the
data. I end Part IV by proposing and testing a four-part theory of en banc
circuit court behavior extrapolated from existing Supreme Court scholarship.
A. Overcoming Limitations to the Study of Circuit Courts
Legal scholars and political scientists are fascinated with the Supreme Court
in part, of course, because of the Court's preeminence. However, many other,
more pragmatic reasons related to the difficulty of studying circuit courts
account for the relative lack of court of appeals studies. First, courts of appeals
operate primarily in rotating divisions of three judges. These three-judge panels
are composed not only of active circuit judges but also of retired members from
the circuit 12 as well as temporarily-designated members from other federal
courts.1 13 Thus, the deliberative body deciding circuit court cases does not have
the coherency and consistency of membership that marks the high court.
Second, circuit courts of appeals do not share the Supreme Court's
prerogative to select cases for review. Thus, most appeals court decisions
involve routine examinations of lower court outcomes, primarily using highly
deferential standards of review, such as abuse of discretion or plain error.
Courts of appeals reverse only about 20% of the cases they review, 114
compared to a reversal rate of 60% to 65% for the Supreme Court. 15 Routine
affirmations do not offer a means for considering normative or positive theories
of adjudication because these theories are relevant only where a judge believes
she has some decisionmaking discretion. Normative theories have been
developed to address "hard" cases, those where there is a real dispute as to the
112 Federal circuit judges who have retired from regular active service may ask to serve
on cases within their circuit. See 28 U.S.C. § 294(c) (1994).
113 The Judicial Code provides that the chief judge of a circuit may assign senior and
active district judges from within the circuit, to sit and decide cases brought before the circuit.
See 28 U.S.C. § 292(a) (1994). The code also provides that the chief justice, at the request of
the chief judge or circuit justice of a circuit, may assign retired Supreme Court justices with
their consent, see 28 U.S.C. § 294(d) (1994), as well as circuit judges from other circuits, see
28 U.S.C. § 291(a) (1994), to sit temporarily on the circuit. These designated judges have the
same authority as circuit judges in the cases in which they participate.
114 See Davis & Songer, The Flow of Litigation Revisited, supra note 2, at 964.
115 See EPSTEINr AL., supra note 2, at 212.
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proper resolution of the question before the court. "Where law and precedent
provide weak guidelines rather than mandates," the judge's decision is more
likely to be the product of attitudes and environment.116
One subset of circuit court decisions, en banc cases, may nevertheless
overcome limitations otherwise inherent in the study of circuit courts. As the
name implies, en bane cases are heard by the entire circuit bench:117 all active
circuit judges, as well as any senior circuit judge of that circuit who sat on the
panel, if one was convened.118 Such decisions allow us to view circuit court
behavior when acting in concert. Hence, en banc cases provide us with a more
coherent body of jurists from which to extrapolate regarding the politics of
deciding appeals at the circuit court level. In addition, en banc hearing
procedures, like the certiorari process, limit the cases reviewed by the entire
court to those selected by a majority of the court's members (a greater
percentage than the Supreme Court's required four out of nine).' 19 This
116 Cook, supra note 47, at 597.
117 Mini en bane hearings were approved by statute in 1978 for circuits of more than 15
active judges. See Pub. L. No. 95-486, § 5(a)(b), 92 Stat. 1633 (codified as amended at 28
U.S.C. § 46(c) (1994)). Only the Ninth Circuit has exercised this option. Under its rules, if a
majority of active, non-recused judges votes for en banc review:
[rihe en banc court, for each case or group of related cases taken en banc, shall
consist of the Chief Judge of this circuit and 10 additional judges to be drawn by lot from
the active judges of the court .... Notwithstanding the provision herein for random
drawing of names by lot, if a judge is not drawn on any of three successive en banc
courts, that judge's name shall be placed automatically on the next en banc court. In
appropriate cases, the Court may order a rehearing by the full court following a hearing
or rehearing en banc.
9rH CIR. R. 35-3.
118 Of course, the rules requiring recusal by a judge who has a conflict of interest apply
to en bane cases as it does to all cases; consequently, an active judge may not participate in all
en banc decisions. Interestingly, only recently did the courts conclude that a recused circuit
judge could not vote on the decision to grant an en banc hearing or rehearing. The issue
sparked much debate prior to its resolution. See, e.g., Janet L. McDavid & Henry T. Reath,
Report to the House of Delegates on Procedures for Rehearing En Banc, 55 An'usr L.J.
665 (1987).
119 The Supreme Court, in 1941, ruled that judges of the courts of appeals had the
power to convene all of the active circuit judges to try cases. See Textile Mills Sec. Corp. v.
Commissioner, 314 U.S. 326 (1941). Congress followed the Court's lead in the next major
act governing the judicial branch-the Judicial Code of 1948--and explicitly recognized the
practice: "Cases and controversies shall be heard and determined by a court or panel of not
more than three judges... unless a hearing or rehearing before the court in bane is ordered
by a majority of the circuit judges of the circuit who are in regular active service. A court in
bane shall consist of all circuit judges in regular active service." 28 U.S.C. § 46(c) (1994).
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procedure creates the presumption that the cases are likely to involve difficult,
complex, highly political, or at least significant questions.' 20 Thus, en banc
But Congress did not resolve the one question left unanswered by the Supreme Court's Textile
Mills decision, namely, the standard by which the courts were to determine whether to rehear
or hear initially an appeal en banc.
Four years later, the Supreme Court held that en banc review of a panel decision was not
a matter of right, as the first appeal from a district court decision typically is, but within the
discretion of the appellate court. See Western Pac. R.R. v. Western Pac. R.R., 345 U.S. 247
(1953). The Court, though, deferred as a matter of deliberate policy to the lower courts'
discretion in weighing what factors supported the grant of full court review. Yet Justice
Frankfurter in a concurring opinion sought to distinguish the function as primarily one for
resolving intra-circuit conflict and cautioned against its use in other cases unless they are
"extraordinary in scale-either because of the amount involved is stupendous or because the
issues are intricate enough to invoke the pooled wisdom of the circuit." Id. at 270-71
(Frankfurter, J., concurring).
A Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure implementing the existing judicial and statutory
grants of power, adopted in 1967, expresses a view of the procedure similar to that expressed
by Frankfurter in his Western Pacific concurrence. See FED. R. App. P. 35. The rule warns
that en banc review is "not favored and ordinarily will not be ordered except (1) when
consideration by the full court is necessary to secure or maintain uniformity of its decisions,
or (2) when the proceeding involves a question of exceptional importance." Id. The language
appears to be drawn from both Frankfurter's concurrence and the Court's opinion in United
States v. American-Foreign Steamship Corp., 363 U.S. 685 (1960). The Court in American-
Steamship observed that "[en banc courts are the exception, not the rule" and should be
"convened only when extraordinary circumstances exist that call for authoritative
consideration and decision by those charged with the administration and development of the
law of the circuit." Id. at 689. But, if the intention of the drafters was to limit the use of en
bane review, the very wording of the rule frustrates that purpose. As Fourth Circuit Judge J.
Dickson Phillips observed: "There is enough flexibility built into the very text of this rule-in
the word 'ordinarily' and in the open-ended expression of 'exceptional importance'-that it
could not be claimed that the rule itself either compels or excludes rehearing en bane in ary
case." Arnold v. Eastern Airlines, 712 F.2d 899, 914 (4th Cir. 1983) (Phillips, J.,
dissenting).
120 Congress has directed circuit courts to consider certain questions initially en bane.
See, e.g., Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, 2 U.S.C. § 437h(a) (1983). This statute
provides:
The [Federal Election] Commission, the national committee of any political party,
or any individual eligible to vote in any election for the office of President may institute
such actions in the appropriate district court of the United States, including actions for
declaratory judgment, as may be appropriate to construe the constitutionality of any
provision of this Act. The district court immediately shall certify all questions of
constitutionality of this Act to the United States court of appeals for the circuit involved,
which shall hear the matter sitting en bane.
Id. These questions-typically concerning the constitutionality of a statute-are significant. See
Note, All the President's Men?: A Study of Ronald Reagan's Appointments to the U.S. Courts of
Appeals, 87 COLUM. L. REv. 766, 787 (1987) (footnote omitted from title) (noting that en banc
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decisions, as opposed to the majority of routine appeals taken by right from
lower federal courts or agencies, should test theories we have developed about
judicial decisionmaking. 121
En bane decisions, in addition to being the most important circuit court
rulings, also may be the most revelatory. They provide insight to theories about
the construction, purpose, and philosophy of intermediate appellate courts in the
legal process.' 22 Judges on a circuit court cannot make decisions individually,
so they must rely on coalition building while still seeking to maximize their
individual policy preferences. By considering the actions these institutions
undertake as a group, we can examine systematically and test analytically
internal dynamics such as ideology and interdependence as well as external
dynamics such as institutional interaction.
B. Empirical Evidence: The En Banc Decisions of the Fourth Circuit
I sought to test my theory against all en banc decisions of one of the twelve
circuits. I rejected the First Circuit because it is atypically small, the Ninth
Circuit because it is unusually large, and the D.C. Circuit because of its largely
administrative law caseload and lack of geographic diversity. I also rejected the
Fifth and Eleventh Circuits because these courts are the offspring of the old
Fifth Circuit that was divided into two circuits in 1981 and was atypically large
prior to that time. Of the remaining seven circuits, I selected the Fourth Circuit
for a number of reasons. It has an average number of judges, an average size
caseload, and a typical distribution of cases by issue area.
The Fourth Circuit was one of the smaller circuit courts initially, with only
two judges permanently assigned under the Judicial Code of 1911. Fifty years
passed before the court had more than three members. Seven judges served on
the Fourth Circuit in 1974, making it one of the three smallest circuits. Twenty
constitutional cases arguably raise the most significant issues and have the greatest precedential
effects).
121 Christopher Smith reasons further that en banc cases provide an effective means of
examining intermediate courts because (1) the cases freuently emanate from the existence of
conflict among a circuits' judges, and (2) the expanded size of the deliberative body increases
the likelihood of dissent. See Christopher E. Smith, Polarization and Change in the Federal
Courts: En Banc Decisions in the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 74 JUDICATURE 133 (1990) (Smith
uses en bane cases decided between 1983 and 1988 to examine the theory that Reagan
appointees to the courts of appeals are more conservative and polemic than other judges. The
study documents the existence of Reagan-appointed voting blocs in appellate cases, but these
polarized decisions have been concentrated in two circuits (D.C. and Eighth Circuits) and are
mirrored by a similar number of Carter-appointed voting blocs.).
122 See, e.g., Christopher P. Banks, The Politics of En Banc Review in the "Mini-
Supreme Court", 13 J. L. & PoL. 377 (1997).
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years later, the court had grown to fifteen and ranked fourth out of twelve in
size. Its caseload, however, has remained the same relative to other circuits.
The Fourth Circuit was fourth out of eleven circuits for total appeals filed in
1974. For 1994, the Fourth Circuit ranked fifth among all twelve circuits in the
number of total appeals filed, as well as the number of criminal and
administrative appeals filed. It had the third highest number of prisoner
appeals. 123
I also was searching for a circuit that included a mix of country and city,
agriculture and industry, and north and south. The Fourth Circuit, which
includes Maryland, North Carolina, South Carolina, Virginia, and West
Virginia, covers a geographic region that reflects some of the diversity present
in the country: industrial North and antebellum South; Baltimore's harbor,
West Virginia's coal mines, and North Carolina's tobacco fields; the capitol of
the confederacy and the affluent and highly-educated suburbs of the nation's
capital; and Charlestons north and south. The business sector includes national
bank headquarters; the Research Triangle; major state, private, and religious
colleges and universities; several significant military bases and federal agencies;
and professional sports teams. The party politics of the region are also mixed,
with leading Republican Senators-Thurmond, Helms, Warner-and leading
Democratic Senators-Byrd, Mikulski, Sarbanes-claiming input on the
appointment of judges for the circuit. Given the problems with other courts and
what the Fourth Circuit offers, I concluded that it was a reasonable choice for
study and would allow for inferences to be drawn about courts of appeals
generally.
To identify the en bane cases decided by the Fourth Circuit in the court's
modem era-1962 through 1996, from the year the court's membership first
exceeded three judges-I conducted WESTLAW and LEXIS searches and
found 274 en bane cases. Figure 3 shows the trend in number of en bane cases
per year during that period. In two years (1966 and 1996), the court decided a
high of sixteen cases en bane; and in both 1969 and 1992, the court decided a
low of three cases. The court decided an average of 7.8 cases en bane per term.
123 See ADMIMNSTRATIVE OFFCE OF THE UNrED STATES COURTS, FEDERAL COURT
MANAGEMENT STATISTICS FOR UNIED STATES CoumRs (1996, 1976) (fact sheets obtained
from the Administrative Office outlining information for 1994 and 1974, respectively).
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Decision Year (1962-1996)
I examined the cases and recorded several features of each case (in research
parlance, I "coded" the cases on many dimensions). 124 Eight coding categories
are relevant here:
(1) citation;
(2) oral argument date (if the court heard argument);
(3) decision date;
(4) issue type;
(5) ideological direction of court's decision;
(6) disposition of case;
(7) each judge's participation, appointing President, and home state; and
(8) subsequent Supreme Court action, if any.
I explain below each category and describe the frequencies and relative
frequencies of observations within each category:
(1)-(3) The citation was simply the federal reporter cite for the case (e.g.,
350 F.2d 1375). The argument and decision dates were the dates listed in the
124 For a discussion of the process of coding content, see JoHN B. WLIAMSON Er AL.,
TE REsEARCH CRAFr: AN INTRoDuClION To SocIAL SCIENCE MErHODs 303-06 (1977).
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reported case for the respective events. I made note if the en banc court did not
hear oral argument (which it did not in a small number of cases).
(4) I categorized each case as one of eight broad issue types derived from
categories used in two databases of federal court decisions: the Supreme Court
Database 125 and the U.S. Court of Appeals Database.' 26 I deferred to the
categories developed by the authors of those databases for several reasons: first,
to allow comparisons between my results and the results in studies using those
databases; second, to provide for easier replication of my study; and third, and
perhaps most importantly, to defer to formulations crafted over time and
through debate among court scholars. The issue areas are: criminal, civil rights,
first amendment, due process (non-criminal), privacy, labor relations, economic
regulation and activity, and miscellaneous. One group of cases, school
desegregation suits, was identified separately on the basis of the uniqueness of
its treatment. Between 1962 and 1977, the Fourth Circuit, as a matter of policy,
heard all school desegregation appeals en bane without awaiting panel review.
The court may have been following the Supreme Court's practice in the Brown
v. Board of Education27 cases of presenting a united front in the face of strong
public opposition. 128 Table 1 reflects the number of en banc cases of each issue
125 See HAROLD J. SPAETH, UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT JUDICIAL DATABASE,
1953-1993 TmwMs: DOCUmNTATION (6th ICPSR version 1995). This multi-user database,
funded by the National Science Foundation and available as a computer file through the Inter-
university Consortium for Political and Social Research [ICPSR], encompasses all aspects of
United States Supreme Court decisionmaling during the 1953 through 1993 terms and is
constantly updated. The data file includes a documentation file explaining the coding
methodology.
126 See DONALD R. SONGER, UNrmD STATES COURT OF APPEALS DATABASE:
DOCUMENATION (Rough Draft Sept. 26, 1996). The U.S. Court of Appeals Database,
modeled after the Supreme Court Database and also funded by the National Science
Foundation, will contain two sets of data. The first is a random sample of cases from each
circuit for each year for the period 1925-1988. The total size for this sample is 15,315 cases.
The second part will include all the appeals court cases whose decisions were reviewed by the
Supreme Court in a decision reported in a full opinion in United States Reports for the period
covered by the Supreme Court Data Base, Phase I. This phase was expected to result in the
coding of approximately 4000 additional cases. The Database is not yet available through the
ICPSR.
127 See Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (Brown I); Brown v. Board of
Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955) (Brown 11). Both were unanimous decisions.
128 See J.W. PELTASON, 58 LONELY MEN: SoUrfMN FEDERAL JUIDES AND SCHOOL
DESEG EGATION (1961) (documenting the influence and power of the ten circuit judges, as
well as the forty-eight district judges, charged with realizing the Supreme Court's decision in
Brown v. Board of Education).
The Brown Court held that separate schools for black and white students were inherently
unequal and thus unconstitutional but failed to explicate what was constitutionally required.
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type ("frequency") and the percentage of all cases each issue type constituted
("relative frequency").
Table 1. Issues Heard En Banc by the Fourth Circuit, 1962-1996
Issue Types Frequency ] Relative Frequency
Criminal 79 28.8%
Civil Rights 42 15.3%
School Desegregation 52 19.0%
First Amendment 12 4.4%
Due Process 11 4.0%
Privacy 0 0.0%
Labor Relations 28 10.2%
Economic Regulation & Activity 28 10.2%
Miscellaneous 22 8.0%
Total . 274 1 100.0%
(5) I coded each decision as liberal
direction variable, again using the Supreme
or conservative, the ideological
Court and U.S. Court of Appeals
Databases as guides. 129 The ideological variable is two-dimensional ("discrete"
or "dichotomous") because it takes on only two possible values (liberal or
conservative), and it reflects whether the court supports or opposes the issue to
Peltason explored and exposed the decisionmaking processes at the lower court levels as the
judges struggled to interpret the broad and ambiguous Brown guidelines in the face of
powerful political, social, and personal forces battling over the issue of school desegregation.
See id. at 24.
129 Obviously, we could debate at length the meaning and application of the worn-out
ideological labels "liberal" and "conservative," but the definitions provided by the authors of
the databases defer to their common meaning during this period and, more importantly, are
explicit about their content. Thus, the variable is a valid and reliable measure because it is
explicitly and specifically defined even if the conservative and liberal labels lack specificity of
meaning. Although I dislike relying on these labels, they remain the "most generally used to
distinguish between opposed complexes of preferences in matters of public policy."
ScHmERT, supra note 27, at 28. The present study, by relying on consistent categorizations,
can be compared to and used with other studies.
For additional discussion of the meaning of liberal and conservative in the context used
here, see supra notes 10, 22 and accompanying text.
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which the case pertains. In criminal, civil rights, first amendment, due process
(non-criminal), privacy, and school desegregation cases, I coded a decision as
"liberal" if it was one of the following:
• pro-criminal defendant,




* pro-female in abortion,
* pro-underdog,
• anti-government in non-takings due process, or
* pro-disclosure (except employment or student records).
I coded a decision as "conservative" if it was the reverse.
For cases involving labor relations or economic regulation and activity, I
coded a decision as liberal if it was:














* pro-trial in arbitration.
I coded economic regulation and activity and labor relations decisions as
conservative if they were decided the opposite way.
I did not code the twenty-two miscellaneous cases by ideological direction
because they did not lend themselves to a reliable (or "replicable")
categorization.
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Table 2 shows the frequency with which each type of case was decided in a
liberal or ponservative direction.130
Table 2. Ideological Direction by Case Issue
I Liberal Conservative
Frequency Relative Freq. Frequency Relative Freq.
Criminal 32 40.5% 47 59.4%
Civil Rights 11 26.2% 31 73.8%
Schiool
sraon 32 61.5% 20 38.5%Desegregation ...
First Amendment 7 58.3% 5 41.7%
Due Process 4 36.4% 7 63.6%
Labor Relations 15 53.6% 13 46.4%
Economic Regulation 11 39.3% 17 60.7%
& Activity
Totals 112 44.4% 140 55.6%
(6) I coded each case according to its disposition. The disposition variable
reflects the treatment the en bane court accorded the court or agency whose
decision it reviewed and is one of eight types: affirmed, reversed, reversed and
remanded, vacated and remanded, affirmed in part and reversed/vacated in
part, affirmed in part and reversed/vacated in part and remanded, vacated, and
dismissed. These eight types are generally of three broader types: affirmed,
reversed, and mixed. As reflected in Figure 4, the reversal rate for en banc
Fourth Circuit cases is substantially higher than that estimated for all circuit
court cases, consistent with the hypothesis that en banc cases are, more
significant than average cases.131
130 The relationship between issue and ideological direction was not statistically
significant.
131 See supra notes 117-21 and accompanying text.
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(7) I coded each judge's participation according to her vote and the nature
of her participation: writing the majority opinion, joining the majority opinion,
concurring, or dissenting. If a judge indicated that she was concurring in part
and dissenting in part, I examined her opinion (or the opinion she joined) to
determine whether it agreed with the ideological direction coded for the
majority opinion. If a judge agreed with some preliminary holding of the
majority, but disagreed with its ultimate conclusion and ideological direction, I
coded her participation as dissenting. If, however, she essentially agreed with
the court's primary holding and ideological direction, but disagreed about
means or implications described in dicta, then I coded the judge as concurring.
I further identified judges according to the name and party of the President
who appointed them and the state in which they maintained their office. In the
relevant time period (1962-1996), twenty-six judges have served on the Fourth
Circuit: fourteen Republican appointees (three appointed by Eisenhower, three
by Nixon, four by Reagan, and four by Bush) and twelve Democratic
appointees (two appointed by Kennedy, three by Johnson, five by Carter, and
two by Clinton). Ten judges have come from the northern states of Maryland
and West Virginia, and sixteen from the Carolinas and Virginia. Five judges
served the Fourth Circuit in 1962 and thirteen currently serve. 132
(8) Finally, I coded the Supreme Court's treatment of en bane cases. For
each case, I recorded whether a certiorari petition had been filed and, if so,
132 Congress has authorized 15 judgeships, but there are two vacancies which President
Clinton has been unable to fill during his tenure.
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how the Supreme Court responded to the petition. Table 3 shows the
frequencies and relative frequencies of the filing of petitions from en bane cases
as well as the success of those petitions by decade. The reversal rate for
decisions reviewed by the high court was slightly higher than the Court's
average of about 60% to 65%. But the most striking finding is the number of
cases reviewed by the Court. It granted certiorari to forty-three petitions from
the en bane Fourth Circuit, or 31% of the cases in which petitions were filed
(not including the two pending petitions), as compared to an average certiorari
grant rate of 7.3% of all cases from all circuits during the same period. 133
Table 3. Supreme Court Review of En Banc Decisions by Decade, 1962-1996
No Appeal/ Appeal Reversed/ Pending
Years Petition Dismissed/ Affirmed Vacated TotalCert. Denied
Fre. R]. req rq. e] Frq. req Re. req Frq. et.Fre.jFreq. Rel. Freq.
62-69 40 58.8% 17 25.0% 4 5.9% 7 10.3% 0 0.0% 68
70-79 37 50.0% 23 31.1% 3 4.1% 11 14.9% 0 0.0% 74
80-89 35 44.3% 29 36.7% 5 6.3% 10 12.7% 0 0.0% 79
90-96 17 32.1% 29 54.7% 0 0.0% 1 1.9% 4! 7.5% 53
TOW al 2 47.1% IO[3.% 1]44 9 06 ~ 15% 274
Relative Frequency as
percentage of cases with 69.0% 8.3% 20.0% 2.8%
petitions filed
Relative Frequency as percentage of cases 27.9% 67.4% 4.7%
granted ce?. I I
*Note: Two certiorari petitions have been granted, but the cases have not been decided. Two other
eniorari petitions remain pending.
C. A Positive Theory
I have considered theories of judicial behavior that have been developed by
studying the Supreme Court. The dominant approach, the attitudinal model,
postulates that policy preferences, or attitudes, produce judicial behavior:
attitudinal studies have proven that attitudes, as measured by the party of the
appointing President, are a strong predictor of the behavior of justices on the
Supreme Court. The newer, and not yet as widely-studied or as widely-
133 See EPSrEIN Er AL., supra note 2, at 81-83 (73,095 certiorari petitions, excluding in
forma paperis, were filed between 1962 and 1995, and the Supreme Court granted review to
5323).
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accepted, approach, the strategic account, largely accepts the argument that
judges seek to attain policy goals but emphasizes the effects of internal and
external influences, which strategists argue dramatically constrain the ability of
a justice to vote his personal policy preferences. Where the attitudinal model
postulates that justices will vote consistently with the ideological direction of
their appointing President's party, the strategic model stipulates that justices will
respond to the positions of others and thus are unlikely to vote consistently in a
strict ideological fashion.
I believe that both theories have merit in the context of the en banc courts
of appeals, but that neither alone can account for most decisions made by
judges or by courts. I propose a positive theory of en banc circuit court
behavior that is a hybrid of the two Supreme Court theories. To develop this
positive theory of en banc court of appeals behavior, I use the two Supreme
Court theories to generate expectations about the bases of circuit court judicial
behavior and to make predictions regarding that behavior. These expectations,
or "hypotheses," predict a certain relationship between variables. 134
The hybrid theory predicts en bane court behavior on a micro- and macro-
level as set forth in four components or "hypotheses." The first two hypotheses
address micro-level behavior while the second two address macro-level
behavior. First, I postulate that most appeals court judges are like Supreme
Court justices, "single-minded seekers of legal policy" 135 who follow their own
sincere preferences as to how a case should be resolved and consequently
behave consistently with the predictions of the attitudinal model. But, second, I
further expect that a small percentage of judges in a given en banc case will act
strategically and, instead of simply following their own preferences, will
respond to the relative positions of their colleagues and the Supreme Court.
Third, I hypothesize the attitudinal model will fail to predict the en banc court's
decision. Finally, I proffer that the Supreme Court's attitudes will influence en
banc behavior. The conclusion is that the attitudinal model will largely explain
micro-level behavior but not macro-level behavior.
In this section, I set forth each of the four hypotheses extrapolated from
Supreme Court theories and test each in turn.
1. Most Judges Vote Consistently with the Party of Their
Appointing President
As discussed above, the attitudinal theory predicts that justices decide cases
based on sincere policy preferences, with the most consistently accurate
134 See Epstein, supra note 9, at 8-9 (defining variables as "'observable characteristics'
of some phenomenon that, as the name suggests, vaiy").
135 George & Epstein, supra note 49, at 325.
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measure of policy preferences, or ideology, being the party of the appointing
President, an unsurprising prediction given judicial selection methods.136
However, the President does not have the same degree of unfettered discretion
in his selection of circuit judges as he has for Supreme Court justices because of
the tradition of senatorial courtesy with respect to senators from the circuit.137
Therefore, we might expect the party of the appointing President to be a weaker
predictor of judicial behavior at the circuit court level than it has been found to
be at the Supreme Court level.
Some evidence supports the conclusion, however, that the use of the
President as a proxy for attitude in modem attitudinal models retains predictive
strength in the circuit court context, at least for the latter half of this century. A
study of appointments during the 1961 to 1964 period found that the court of
appeals "appointment process can be characterized as a highly complex
negotiations process consisting of several components. Those selected for
appointment have tended to be political activists reflecting (to some extent) the
values and outlook of the appointing administration." 138 We would expect this
finding to be even more true since the time of that study because, as the circuit
courts have risen in prominence, Presidents have increased the attention given
to the naming of circuit judges:139 taking a leading role in their selection,
investigating the political philosophy of prospective nominees, and seeking to
appoint like-minded jurists to the circuit bench. The Carter administration, for
example, actively sought to name judges who were liberal, particularly on civil
rights issues, to the courts of appeals. 140 Carter's Republican successors,
136 See sUpra notes 49-57 and accompanying text.
137 See WASBY, supra note 15, at 97 ("In the first half of the twentieth centary,
patronage considerations dominated in appellate court nominations in administrations not
concerned about the court's policy-making possibilities, but a mix of patronage and concerns
about professionalism occurred where government's role was limited but judges' role in
policy-making was recognized," such as during the FDR administration.); HENRY J.
AB-m, TE JUDICA PROcEss 23-25 (6th ed. 1993).
138 Sheldon Goldman, Judicial Appointments to the United States Courts of Appeals,
1967 Ws. L. REv. 186. The object of Goldman's article was to analyze the various
components of the selection process, and in particular the role of politics and ideology in the
process and, in turm, the kind of people appointed. He gathered the data from a systematic
study of Justice Department files produced for the nomination process for each of the 84
judges in active service on the appeals courts during part or all of the period between 1961
and 1964.
139 Richard Nixon may have been the first President to recognize the prospect for
influencing national policy by systematically controlling the appointment of judges to lower
federal courts. See Goldman, supra note 50, at 294-95 (quoting communications between
Nixon and White House aid Tom Charles Huston found in White House Central Files).
140 See LAWRENCE BAUM, THE SUPREME COURT40 (3d ed. 1989).
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Ronald Reagan and George Bush, worked with equal effort to appoint judges
who supported school prayer, opposed abortion, and favored harsh criminal
penalties. 141 Studies of the circuit judge appointment process support the
hypothesis that circuit judges, particularly during the period of the present study
(1962-1996), will vote in line with the ideological direction of the party of the
appointing President.' 42
In testing the attitudinal model as a predictor of micro-level judicial
behavior, I am seeking to explain the vote of the individual judge. This is the
dependent variable. 143 The independent variable (or explanatory variable) is the
factor believed to cause variation in the dependent variable. My independent
141 See id. See generally Robert A. Carp et al., The Voting Behavior of Judges
Appointed by President Bush, 76 JUDICATUm 298 (1993); Sheldon Goldman, Reagan's
Judicial Legacy: Completing the Puzzle and Summing Up, 72 JUDICATURE 318 (1989);
Goldman, supra note 50.
142 Some legal observers doubt that Clinton's appointments to the lower courts will
prove as liberal as the appointments of his Democratic predecessors, most notably Carter. See
Jeffrey Toobin, Clinton's Left-Hand Man, NEW YoRKER, July 21, 1997, at 28, 29-30. Mr.
Toobin states:
[T]he Clinton judges are an ideologically bland group. "The Clinton appointments are
philosophically moderate," says Nan Aron, the president of the liberal Alliance for
Justice, which monitors judicial appointments. "Studies show that they have the same
ideological underpinnings as Gerald Ford's appointments. They're less liberal than
Jimmy Carter's." [Deputy Attorney General] Jamie Gorelick says, "On choices of
judicial candidates, the President has often been more comfortable with the more middle-
of-the-road, less doctrinaire candidates."
Id. The first systematic study of circuit court decisions by Clinton appointees found that
Clinton appointees were not as liberal overall as Carter appointees (36% versus 43%) but
were significantly more liberal than Nixon (30%), Ford (29%), Reagan (32%), or Bush
(30%) appointees. Ronald Stidham et al., The Voting Behavior of President Clinton's Judicial
Appointees, 80 JUDICATURE 16, 17, 20 (1996). The numbers in parentheses reflect the
percentage of liberal decisions reached by appointees of each President in the sample of
circuit court cases from 1994-1995. The overall statistics hide an important distinction
between Clinton's and Carter's circuit judges: Carter's were much more liberal than Clinton's
in criminal justice cases (40% versus 31%) though Clinton circuit judges were still more
liberal than Nixon (26%), Ford (20%), Reagan (26%), or Bush (22%) judges in the criminal
justice issue area. See id. at 20. But Carter and Clinton judges were comparably liberal in
civil rights and liberties cases (42% versus 41%), an issue area in which the most liberal
Republican appointees in these cases, Ford appointees, took a liberal position 35 % of the time
and the most conservative, Nixon appointees, took a liberal position 29% of the time. See id.
143 The dependent variable is the phenomenon to be explained and which is believed to
be influenced, affected, or caused by some other phenomenon known as an independent
variable.
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variable is the direction of the court's decision. 144 I am seeking to test whether
there is a relationship between the dependent variable and the independent
variable and, if so, to estimate the strength of that relationship. My bivariate
model (one with only one independent variable) hypothesizes that the
ideological direction of the en banc court's decision (the independent variable Ii)
causes variation in the voting position of the judge (the dependent variable Ji)-
joining the majority or dissenting-in the following manner: if the court's
decision is liberal, a Democratic appointee will vote to join the court's decision
while a Republican appointee will dissent; and if the court's decision is
conservative, a Democratic appointee will dissent and a Republican appointee
will join the majority.
When utilizing statistical techniques (like linear regression or logit), we use
null and alternative hypotheses. Our statistical test will seek to disprove the null
hypothesis and thereby accept the alternative hypothesis. 145 My null hypothesis
(H) is that there is no interaction between the direction of a judge's decision
and the party of the President who appointed her. My alternative hypothesis
(Ha) is that judicial behavior is influenced by attitudes as measured by the party
of the appointing President. The Hypothesis 1 model can be expressed as set
forth below in Figure 5:
Figure 5. Hypothesis 1 Model: 146
lc(Ji=O) = P0 + PIiR
144 We also can use more than one, or multiple, independent variables, creating a multi-
variate model.
145 We cannot prove Ho . We simply seek to disprove it. Ha is accepted if the test results
in rejection of the null. A good example of null and alternative hypotheses are those we use in
our system of criminal justice. Our null hypothesis is that the defendant is innocent
(H=innocent). Our alternative hypothesis is that the defendant is guilty (Ha=guilty). Our
test statistic is a jury of peers. The p-statistic is the likelihood of guilt. The criminal justice
system does not require proof that the defendant is innocent; rather, the prosecutor simply
seeks to disprove it. Given our standard of reasonable doubt, the likelihood of innocence
calculated by the jury must be less than or equal to .01 (p <.0l) for the system to reject the
null and accept the alternative, thus finding the defendant guilty. If the jury finds that the
likelihood of innocence is greater than .01, we fail to reject the null-that is, we find the
defendant not guilty (but we do not find the defendant to be innocent).
146 The dependent variable Ji is the voting position of the judge which is a binary
variable equal to 0 if the judge votes with the majority and equal to 1 if she dissents. it(Ji=0)
is the probability of a given judge's vote being the same direction as the majority's decision.
P0 is the constant. The independent variable I, is the ideological direction of the court's
majority decision. The parameter of Ii is 13I .
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I evaluate the Hypothesis 1 model using the parameter estimation strategy
of logit:' 47
A great many political variables are discrete: an event either happens or it
doesn't; we either observe a characteristic or we don't. Probit and logit models
are common statistical tools for analyzing such discrete (or dichotomous)
dependent variables-outcomes that can take on only one of two possible
values .... It is easiest to understand and interpret the probit and logit models
by focusing on the probabilities of observing these discrete dependent
variables. That is, what are the chances of observing one outcome rather than
the other? Suppose that the probability, which may be represented as iri, of
observing the characteristic in question is somewhere between zero and one for
case i.148
147 See supra note 84. Logistic procedure fits a logistic regression model for binary
response data by the method of maximum likelihood. A multiple logistic regression model
takes the form:
logit (n ) = (log (Kt/1 - 7)) = a + 01 x, +.. + Pk xk.
See AGRasri & FINLAY, supra note 84, at 486-92 (discussing logit models for
categorical independent variables); id. at 488-92 (discussing a study of the effects of racial
characteristics of the defendant and of the victim on the decision to impose the death penalty
after the defendant was convicted of homicide); SEGAL & SPAmrH, supra note 34, at 370-72
(discussing the logit model).
I use logit instead of the more traditional linear regression probability model because
underlying assumptions of that model are not satisfied. As an initial matter, linear regression
assumes a linear relationship exists between an increase in the independent variable and an
increase in the dependent variable and such is not the case where we are talking about the
probability of an event occurring (i.e., the likelihood of a judge joining the majority). Also,
linear models predict values of the dependent variable in the whole range of numbers (- to
o) instead of the restricted range for dichotomous variables of 0 or 1. Logit solves these
problems by using an S-shaped (as opposed to a linear) probability function. It is called
"logit" because it is formulated in terms of the log of the odds ratio. See AGr~srI & FINLAY,
supra note 84, at 489; SEGAL & SPAEMH, supra note 34, at 368-69 (discussing why linear
regression poses mathematical problems when used to estimate relationships where the
dependent variable is dichotomous-has only two values).
Logit poses its own interpretive problems as the coefficients cannot be as readily
interpreted as in a linear model because they refer to the log scale. See SEGAL & SPAEMH,
supra note 34, at 370. In addition, the problem of serial correlation has proven to be
"'untractable'" in logit. George & Epstein, supra note 49, at 335 n.21 (quoting ALDRICH &
NELSON, supra note 84).
148 David C. Nixon, Appendix B: Probit and Logit, in CONTEMPLATnG CouRTS 430,
430 (Lee Epstein ed., 1995).
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In my model, the probability of interest is the likelihood of a particular
judge voting with the majority (7r(Ji)). I use the ideological direction of the
majority's decision (Ii) to predict the likelihood of a particular judge joining the
majority. This "explanatory variable[] (also called [an] independent variable[])
[is] used to test whether the conditions [it] indicate[s] increase or decrease the
probability of observing the dependent variable to a statistically significant
degree." 149 Here, then, the expectation is that if the ideological direction of the
court's decision (the independent variable) is liberal, the probability of a
Democratic appointee (the dependent variable) joining the majority is higher
and the probability of a Republican appointee (the dependent variable) joining
the majority is lower.
As Professor David Nixon explains:
Independent variables are significant to varying degrees in predicting the
dependent variable. [A] logit ... model[] employ[s] a numerical technique,
maximum likelihood, to derive estimates of coeffcients for each of the
explanatory variables. These coefficients, which may be represented as 3,
indicate the direction and strength of the relationship between the independent
and dependent variables. If a coefficient is positive, then larger values of the
independent variable are associated with a higher probability of observing a 1
for the dependent variable.150
So, a positive coefficient (p, > 0) for a given judge indicates that she was more
likely to join a conservative majority and less likely to join a liberal one.
The significance level is the weight of evidence supporting the null
hypothesis. Thus, the smaller the number representing the significance level the
greater the degree of confidence with which we reject the null hypothesis.
Statistical significance is a technical term not to be confused with importance or
validity. To say that a finding is statistically significant at the .001 level means
that the finding would not have occurred by chance more than one time in a
thousand. By convention, a finding which has a random probability of less than
.05 is described as statistically significant. 151
As reflected in Table 4, the direction of the court's decision is a statistically
significant explanation for the votes of 18 out of 25 judges: 16 at the .001 level,
1 at the .01 level, and 1 at the .05 level. (Judge Sneeden is not included in this
analysis as he only participated in three en banc cases.) Moreover, the estimates
for the parameters (as reflected in the MLE column) are large enough
(particularly in light of the SE estimates) that we may legitimately conclude that
149 Id. at 430-31.
150 Id. at 431.
151 See, e.g., AGREsn& FITLAY, supra note 84.
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the independent variable is a significant aid in predicting the dependent
variable. Thus, the attitudinal model explains with a tremendous degree of
confidence the voting behavior of most judges participating in en bane cases.
We can say that the majority of circuit judges participating in en banc cases
vote their sincere policy preferences, or ideology, without constraint from their
colleagues or the Supreme Court.
DEVELOPING A POSITIVE THEORY
Table 4. Logistic Regression and Correlation Matrix of Hypothesis 1 Model
Judge (Party of App. MWE (S.E.) Ct=Liberal Ct=ConservativePres.) Majority Dissent Majority Dissent
Sobeloff (R) -3.8917*** (0.7019) 47 0 12 16
Haynsworth (R) 1.018 (0.5552) 62 13 66 5
Boreman (R) 2.0302 (1.0803) 39 9 33 1
Bryan (D) 1.6368* (0.6744) 36 15 37 3
Bell (D) -3.7997** (0.9104) 29 0 8 9
Winter (D) -3.5264*** (0.6348) 60 3 30 51
Craven (D) -2.0600 (1.1111) 34 1 26 6
Butzner (D) -2.3709*** (0.5859) 46 4 29 27
Russell (R) 2.7445*** (0.4920) 32 29 103 6
Field (R) 1.6227 (1.1702) 15 4 19 1
Widener (R) 3.0090*** (0.4984) 25 32 95 6
Hall (D) 0.6369 (0.4026) 27 16 67 21
Phillips (D) -1.6768** (0.5002) 24 7 25 39
Murnaghan (D) -2.4441*** (0.5424) 30 5 25 48
Sprouse (D) -2.1547** (0.6749) 23 3 24 27
Ervin (D) -3.4784*** (0.7742) 31 2 22 46
Chapman (R) 3.8837*** (0.8233) 9 11 43 0
Wilkinson (R) 4.1225*** (0.8508) 7 16 54 2
Sneeden (R) n.a. - - 3 0
Wilkins (R) -4.6961** (1.4256) 14 6 53 0
Niemeyer (R) 4.1787** (0.9459) 5 10 26 0
Hamilton (R) 0.0606 (0.8269) 8 3 17 6
Luttig (R) 4.4410"** (1.1157) 3 8 23 0
Williams (R) 4.4262 (2.4846) 8 2 22 0
Michael (D) -6.1129*** (1.4367) 8 0 1 19
Motz (D) -4.1497* (1.3865) 6 0 4 11
Note: The model is testing the probability of each judge (the dependent variable)
joining the majority based on the direction of the majority's ruling (the independent
variable). MLE=maximum likelihood estimate for the parameter. S.E. =standard
error.*significant at .05; **significant at .01; ***significant at .001.
In all but two instances, the judge's ideological bias is consistent with the
hypothesized effect of the party of the President who appointed the judge. The
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first exception is Eisenhower appointee Simon Sobeloff, who voted with an
indisputable liberal bias.' 52 Interestingly, several southern senators opposed
President Eisenhower's nomination of Sobeloff, a former Chief Judge of the
Maryland Supreme Court and Solicitor General of the United States, who had
been active in Republican party affairs. These senators predicted, correctly, that
Sobeloff would prove to be a liberal judge:
[Sobeloff's] liberal racial attitudes had sparked strong opposition from southern
senators during his confirmation hearings. At one point Senator Eastland [from
Mississippi] had exclaimed, "The kindest thing that can be said about the
nominee is that he is on the borderline of Red philosophy"... Eastland
showed his great displeasure with the Sobeloff nomination by bottling up
confirmation inside the Judiciary Committee for one year before a vote was
taken.153
The other judge, Albert Bryan, a Democrat from Virginia appointed by
Kennedy, may have behaved in a way more reflective of a Southern Democrat
although the other democratic appointments from the southern states within the
Fourth Circuit do not exhibit the same regional distinction.
2. A Few Judges Do Not Vote Consistently with the Party of Their
Appointing President but Instead Vote Strategically
Circuit courts of appeals, like the Supreme Court, are collegial institutions
that decide cases collectively, and when sitting en bane, they decide cases as an
entire group. 154 Thus, appeals coirt judges, again like Supreme Court justices,
must rely on negotiation strategies to influence how cases are decided.155
152 Sobeloff was not the only Eisenhower appointee to vote more like a Democratic
appointee. Eisenhower Supreme Court appointees Chief Justice Warren and Justice Brennan
also behaved contrary to the predicted ideological direction. "Indeed, according to a widely
circulated but apparently apocryphal story, Eisenhower was asked if he had made any
mistakes as President and replied, 'Yes, two, and they are both sitting on the Supreme
Court.'" BAUM, supra note 51, at 42 (quoting Alyssa Sepinwail, The Making of a
Presidential Myth, WALL ST. J., Sept. 4, 1990, at All (letter)).
153 See DEBORAH J. BARRow & THo As G. WALim, A CouRT DImED: TE Fum
CIRcurr CouRT OF APPEALS AND THE Pou-cs OF JUDIcIAL REFORM 81 (1988) (citing 102
CONG. REC. 12855 (1956); PELTASON, supra note 128, at 24).
154 See supra note 70-71 and accompanying text.
155 First Circuit Senior Judge Frank Coffin has described appellate judicial collegiality
as:
The deliberately cultivated attitude among judges of equal status and sometimes widely
differing views working in intimate, continuing, open, and noncompetitive relationship
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Murphy did not examine whether his hypotheses would also apply to courts of
appeals, but he expected that the bargaining process he documented on the
Supreme Court would occur on any collegial court which follows similar
formal rules to reach a group decision. 156
The procedures governing en banc circuit court decisionmaking are like
those governing Supreme Court decisionmaking in meaningful ways. First, the
majority rules. Second, individual judges have the discretion to vote as they
wish-they determine how they shall vote and which opinion to join. Third, the
judges meet in conference after oral argument to take an initial vote, but the
vote is not binding. Fourth, after conference, the judges are in regular
communication regarding the decision, and draft opinions are circulated. Fifth,
judges may change their votes and make comments on draft opinions during
this stage. Sixth, the position of each judge is known by the other judges during
this process of deciding. Finally, the judge does not have to adopt her ultimate
position until immediately before the decision is announced.
In light of the similarities in Supreme Court and circuit court
decisionmaking processes, I hypothesize that the same internal strategic
dynamics observed in studies of the Supreme Court will also play out in the
courts of appeals with respect to a minority of judges. Small group theory and
the strategic account inform our expectations by telling us that judges within a
group may forego their policy preferences in favor of other goals, such as
influence on the content of the majority opinion, participation on the winning
side, or position as a pivotal voter. The internal strategic phenomena observed
on the Supreme Court (e.g., opinion writing and signing negotiations and swing
justices) support the hypothesis that judges will vote against their policy
with each other, which manifests respect for the strengths of the others, restrains one's
pride of authorship, while respecting one's own deepest convictions, values patience in
understanding and compromise in nonessentials, and seeks as much excellence in the
court's decision as the combined talents, experience, insight, and energy of the judges
permit.
FRANKM. CoFFiN, ON APPEAL: CouRs, LAwYERiNG AND JUDGING 215 (1994).
Judge Coffin asserts, based on personal experience, that the growth in the number of
judges in a court results in a corresponding decrease in collegiality because each judge sits
less frequently with any other judge. This certainly makes sense: if you anticipate the need to
persuade someone in the future-if you have a long term relationship with successive
interactions-you will be more cooperative. Second Circuit Senior Judge James Oakes
concurs: "nine times out of ten proximity makes the heart grow fonder, or, perhaps it should
be put, makes the minds more compatible." James L. Oakes, On Appeal: Courts, Lawyering,
and Judging, 104 YALEL.J. 2369, 2376 (1995) (book review).
156 See Walter F. Murphy, Courts as Small Groups, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1565, 1569
(1966).
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preferences (or inconsistently with the predictions of the attitudinal model) for
strategic reasons but only to join the majority, not to dissent. 157
An empirical test of the micro-level attitudinal model on the Fourth
Circuit's en banc decisions (Hypothesis 1 model) reveals that seven Fourth
Circuit judges did not vote strictly according to their policy preferences as
measured by the party of the appointing President: Judges Haynsworth,
Boreman, Craven, Field, Hall, Hamilton, and Williams.1 58 A close
examination of the voting behavior of these judges reveals a common thread
connecting them: they voted consistently with the majority.
Table 5. Swing Judges on the Fourth Circuit, 1962-966
Signed onto Majority DissentedJudge Freq. Rel. Freq. Freq. Rel. Freq.
Haynsworth (R) 128 87.7% 18 12.3%
Boreman (R) 72 87.8% 10 12.2%
Craven (D) 60 89.6% 7 10.4%
Field (R) 34 87.2% 5 12.8%
Hall (D) 94 71.8% 37 28.2%
Hamilton (R) 25 73.5% 9 26.5%
Williams (R) 30 93.8% 2 6.3%
Judges Haynsworth, Boreman, Craven, Field, and Williams all voted with
the majority at a rate more than one standard deviation above the court's
average, while Judges Hall and Hamilton joined the majority slightly more
often than average. In the instance of Haynsworth, Boreman, Craven, and
Field, each judge joined liberal majorities roughly as often as conservative
majorities. Judge Williams was not able to join as many liberal majorities
157 See supra notes 70-104 and accompanying text.
158 We can conclude that the attitudinal model does not account for the voting behavior
of these judges for two reasons: (1) the independent variable is not statistically significant for
six of the judges, and (2) the parameter estimates (maximum likelihood estimates of 3) for
each judge is small relative to the standard deviation estimate (SE). If 13 is less than two
standard deviations greater than (or less than) zero, we cannot conclude that the independent
variable (here the ideological direction of the court's decision) is related to the dependent
variable (here the vote of the judge).
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because the en banc court recently has not turned that direction as often; but she
had roughly the same low rate of dissent from liberal majorities as from
conservative ones and has the highest majority participation rate in en bane
cases of any Fourth Circuit judge during the period of this study, 1962-1996.
Since these judges voted more frequently with the majority than the
average judge, we can conclude that they were swing judges. We may not be
able to determine from this test why they vote with the majority (e.g., to
influence majority opinion content, to achieve status, or to avoid loss). But, we
can conclude that they are behaving strategically as evidenced by their
willingness to join majority opinions and give up the opportunity to file
dissenting opinions even though the majority decision conflicts with our proxy
for their policy preferences.
Figure 6. Swing Judges by Tenure
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We can also discern that the Fourth Circuit has had at least one swing
judge, if not more, during the period of this study. Figure 6 graphically
represents the tenure time line of each swing judge and discloses that the swing
judges' terms cover the period of interest. Thus, a strategic judge was
participating in most en bane decisions of the court.
I ..........
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3. The Presence of Swing Judges Will Result in an En Banc Court That
Does Not Vote Consistently with the Party of the Appointing President of
the Majority Coalition
Since the internal dynamics strategic model proves correct for at least some
of the judges in the en banc circuit court context, then the attitudinal model will
fail to predict the entire court's decision-that is, it will fail as a macro-level
model. If the court has several swing judges (as reflected in a test of Hypothesis
2), then we will not be able to explain the en banc court's decisions by looking
primarily to its composition because the swing judges will vote against their
party cohort to join majorities. That is, we would not expect the entire court to
vote consistently in line with the majority coalition's party due to the strategic
behavior of swing judges.
To test this expectation, we look at the relationship between the court's
composition by party of the appointing President and the ideological direction
of the decision of the court (or a majority of the court); such an examination is
a macro-level analysis. The ideological direction of a given decision is our
dependent variable (C). Our independent variable is the relative number of
Republican appointees participating in the decision. We seek to test here, as we
did in Hypothesis 1, whether there is a relationship between the dependent and
independent variables and, if there is, the strength of the relationship. My null
hypothesis (Ho) is that there is no interaction between the ideological direction
of the court's decision and the party of the appointing President of its members.
My alternative hypothesis (Ha) is the opposite. The Hypothesis 3 model can be
expressed as in Figure 7:
Figure 7. Hypothesis 3 Model:159
C(Ci=0) = P0 + PlR1
I evaluate the Hypothesis 3 model, as I did the Hypothesis 1 model, using
logit.160 In the Hypothesis 3 model, the probability of interest is the likelihood
159 The dependent variable Ci is the direction of the court's decision which is a binary
variable equal to 0 if the Court rules in a liberal direction, 1 otherwise. n(Ci=O) is the
probability of a given court decision being liberal. 130 is the constant. The independent
variables R, is a dummy ratio variable reflecting the court's party composition. The value of
Ri increases as the number of Republican appointees increases relative to the number of
Democratic appointees. The parameter of R, is 3I. (I also tested a second model with an
independent variable that was continuous and represented the percentage of Republican
appointees who participated in the court's decision. The models produced comparable
results.)
160 See supra notes 84, 147-51 and accompanying text.
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of the court voting in a particular ideological direction (7t(Ci)). I use the
composition of the court by the party of the appointing President (Ri) to predict
the likelihood of the court voting in a particular ideological direction.
Hypothesis 3 predicts that the ideological direction of the court's decision-
the dependent variable-is unrelated to the party of the appointing President of
the judges (the independent variable-Ri). So we will find support for
Hypothesis 3 if we fail to reject the null hypothesis.
The results of the logistic regression of the Hypothesis 3 model are set forth
in Table 6. We fail to reject the null hypothesis and cannot conclude that there
is a relationship between composition of court by party of the appointing
President (the independent variable) and the ideological direction of the court's
decision (the dependent variable).
Table 6. Logistic Regression of Hypothesis 3 Model
Independent Variables MLE S.E. Sig (p<x)
Republican Appointee (Ri) -.0044 .0661 N.S.
Constant .2453 - -
-2 Log Likelihood .004 N.S.
Note: The dependent variable is the direction of the court's decision (i.e., liberal or
conservative) in all cases categorized for direction; N=252. The model is calculating
the probability of a given decision being liberal. Of the 252 cases, the direction was
liberal in 112 or 44.4%. MLE=maximum likelihood estimate for the parameter;
S.E. =standard error; Sig=significance levels. N.S. = not significant.
Another way to think about the relative success or failure of a model is to
ask whether the model predicts better than an uninformed observer. If you were
simply to guess that the en banc Fourth Circuit decided a case conservatively,
you would be right 55.6% of the time. We want a model to improve on
guessing, reducing the amount of error. The Hypothesis 3 model (a macro-level
attitudinal model) correctly categorizes 55.6% of the cases and thus produces
no reduction in error. 161
The attitudinal model, though successful in predicting the behavior of most
Fourth Circuit judges, misses the decision reached by the court, arguably a
more important concern as the court's decision is ultimately the one that
161 Reduction in error = 100 x % correctly classified- % in the modal categorv
100% - % in the modal category
See George & Epstein, supra note 49, at 335 n.20.
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matters. The failure of the model could be attributable to the strategic influences
on the judges the attitudinal model failed to explain.
4. En Banc Courts of Appeals Will Vote Relatively Consistently with the
Ideological Composition of the Supreme Court
Judicial decisions in the federal system can be overruled by other actors:
the Supreme Court can be overruled in certain instances by the Congress and
the President. Likewise, courts of appeals are subject to review and possible
reversal by the Supreme Court. Appeals court judges, like Supreme Court
justices, are aware of this constraint on their ability to attain their policy goals.
Based on strategic theory considering the effects of external forces, we would
expect policy-oriented appeals court judges to consider the relative ideological
position of the Supreme Court when making their decisions and to modify their
behavior if necessary to prevent reversal. 162
But not all circuit court decisions are reviewed by the high court, as not all
losing litigants seek Supreme Court review163 and the Court has discretionary
control over those cases that are appealed. 164 The Supreme Court's oversight
power is further narrowed by its limited capacity to review lower court
decisions due to its scarce resources (one body deciding all cases collectively)
coupled with the burgeoning size of the federal caseload. 165 We might suppose
then that courts of appeals would not feel constrained by the Supreme Court's
authority. But the specter of reversal and its associated reputational and
policymaking costs may, despite the low risk of reversal, influence lower court
decisions. 166 We would expect that courts of appeals decisions may be
162 See Segal et al., Decisionmaking, supra note 7 (testing a hierarchical model, which
views circuit judges as policy seekers restrained by the presence of a superior-the Supreme
Court-in the judicial hierarchy, by examining search and seizure cases); Songer et al., supra
note 7, at 277 (examining "Supreme Court-circuit court interaction from a principal-agent
perspective, employing a fact pattern analysis to determine the extent to which circuit courts
follow their own policy preferences versus the extent that they follow the policy dictates of the
Supreme Court").
163 See Davis & Songer, The Flow of Litigation Revisited, supra note 2 (estimating that
the rate of Supreme Court review of circuit court holdings is less than 1% after accounting for
the rate of certiorari filings and the rate of grants).
164 See EPsrEiN Er AL., supra note 2, at 81-83 (stating that the Supreme Court granted
review to 11% of petitions in 1960 and to 4% in 1995).
165 See FEDERAL COURT MANAGEMENT STATISTICS FOR UNITED STATES COURTS, supra
note 123; Dragich, supra note 5.
166 Second Circuit Judge Frank opined that the courts of appeals are "merely a reflector,
serving as a judicial moon" to the Supreme Court's sun. Choate v. Commissioner, 129 F.2d
684, 686 (2d Cir. 1942).
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explained in part by looking to the ideological composition of the Supreme
Court, but that the Court's ideological stance would not account for most
variance in lower court outcomes (that is, it would be a statistically significant
though relatively weak explanation for rulings).
In evaluating Hypothesis 4, we are interested in considering the relationship
between the composition of the Supreme Court and the ideological direction of
a decision of the en banc Fourth Circuit (or a majority of the en banc circuit
court). Hypothesis 4 predicts that the ideological direction of the Fourth
Circuit's en bane decision-the dependent variable (Ci)-is related to the
ideological composition of the Supreme Court (the independent variable-SCi-
measured in the relative number of Republican appointees on the Court). SC i is
an ordinal variable that increases as the number of Republican Supreme Court
appointees increases, and that decreases as the number decreases, with the
initial value set at the 1962 term.167 My null hypothesis (Ho) is that there is no
relationship between the ideological direction of the court's decision and the
party of the appointing President of the justices of the Supreme Court. My
alternative hypothesis (Ha) is that court outcomes are influenced by Supreme
Court composition. The Hypothesis 4 model is set forth in Figure 8 and is
tested using logit:
Figure 8. Hypothesis 4 Model: 168
Ir(Ci=0) = + pisci
167 1 ran a separate statistical test to determine whether the relative political composition
of the Supreme Court was substantially the same as the composition of the Fourth Circuit, and
thus not amenable to segregating in this fashion. That is, if both variables are varying at the
same rate and in the same direction, the Supreme Court variable may simply measure the
same thing as the Fourth Circuit composition variable. I found a positive but very weak
relationship between the variables and thus conclude that the test of the Hypothesis 4 model is
not measuring the same thing as the test of Hypothesis 3.
168 The dependent variable Ci is the direction of the court's decision which is a binary
variable equal to 0 if the Court rules in a liberal direction, 1 otherwise. 7t(Ci=0) is the
probability of a given court decision being liberal. 130 is the constant. The independent
variable SCi is a dummy ordinal variable reflecting the number of Republican appointees on
the Supreme Court. The parameter of SCi is P1.
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The results are set forth in Table 7:
Table 7. Logistic Regression of Hierarchical Model of All En Banc
Cases Categorizel by Direction, 1962-1996
Independent Variable MLE S.E. Sig (p < x)
Supreme Court (SCi) 0.2828 (0.0755) 0.0002
Constant -0.5597 - -
-2 Log Likelihood 14.655 0.0001
Note: The dependent variable is the direction of the court's decision (i.e.,
liberal or conservative) in all cases categorized for directiog N=252. Of
these cases, the direction was conservative in 140 or 55.6%.
MLE=maximum likelihood estimate for the parameter; S.E. =standard
error; Sig=significance levels.
The results of the statistical test of Hypothesis 4 demonstrate that the
Supreme Court's composition by party of the justice's appointing President is a
statistically significant factor explaining the decisionmaking of the en bane
Fourth Circuit. But the Supreme Court's ideological composition is a weak
factor as shown in the small maximum likelihood estimate for the parameter,
p.169 These findings support the conclusion that the Supreme Court, by its mere
presence, acts as a constraining force on the decisions of the Fourth Circuit;
but, the high court does not completely govern the lower court's rulings. The
Supreme Court, then, continues to be a check on the behavior of the lower
court.
V. CONCLUSION
Based on the theories and empirical evidence presented here, we can
explain and predict micro-level judicial behavior on the en banc courts of
169 Smaller values of 1, as reflected in the MLE column, are associated with flatter
curves and a weaker reaction of the dependent variable to variation in the independent
variable. The closer 3 is to 0, the less the independent variable explains about the probability
of observing a 1 for the dependent variable. See Nixon, supra note 148, at 431. How do we
decide when an independent variable's explanatory value is so weak as to be practically
irrelevant? If 3 is more than two standard deviations (SE) greater or less than 0, "we are 95%
confident that the independent variable is related to the dependent variable ([i.e.,] is
nonzero)." Id. at 433. Here, our maximum likelihood estimate of the parameter 13 (.2828) is
more than two standard deviations (SE = .0755) greater than 0, so we are 95% confident that
the composition of the Supreme Court does help to predict the ideological direction of an en
bane decision of the Fourth Circuit.
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appeals in light of the party of the President who appointed the judges. Most
courts of appeals judges vote their attitudes. But the influence of individual
attitudes on judicial decisionmaking appears to be vitiated for a minority of
judges by the presence of other judges and the Supreme Court. These judges
vote strategically. These two findings taken together mean that courts-the
macro-level unit of analysis-are balanced. Thus, the institutional structure of
the federal courts (collegiality and hierarchy) is successful at achieving the goal
of limiting or moderating the behavior of judges at the intermediate appellate
level. The use of multi-judge decisionmaking bodies combined with the
presence of actors who can limit or reverse their decisions has the net effect of
curbing preference maximization. That these internal and external constraints
prevent unfettered discretion is probably by design, though the means by which
the goal is achieved may be other than expected. The result is equilibrium on a
given court between those judges acting to pursue policy and those seeking to
achieve strategic ends.
Most judges believe they are classicists and go to great lengths to explain
their decisions by reference to existing law. Rare is the judge who will go on
record saying she is a raw instrumentalist. And despite legal realism, critical
legal theory, and their permutations, most scholars and practitioners also
perceive themselves largely as classicists. Consequently, many judges, scholars,
and practitioners espousing normative theory may challenge the relevance of
my positive theory to their work. But, for normative theory to be coherent, it
must respond to what is actually going on, not merely what judges perceive
themselves to be doing, or the prescription can only be persuasive to those
judges already receptive to the idea. Normative theory uninformed by positive
theory is built upon a foundation that is inherently flawed because it relies on
the premise that judges are following classical legal theory.
Taken as a whole, then, what are the implications of my findings for the
development of normative theories? On some level, the answer is obvious: the
most fully articulated and grounded normative theories should incorporate,
consider, and respond to the realities of how judges make decisions. The
question of the implications of my findings for specific prescriptive theories is
best left for those scholars developing such theories.
I would suggest, however, that scholars concerned about the growing
caseload and size of the federal circuit courts because they fear that the larger
circuit courts will be too divided and that the Supreme Court will lose its ability
to retain control over the development of national law should reconsider the
degree of their fear. My findings for the Fourth Circuit indicate that an internal
equilibrium is achieved within an appellate court and remains even as the court
grows-a balance achieved by strategic judges restraining the power of
ideology-driven judges. Similarly, the Supreme Court maintained some
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authority over the decisions of the Fourth Circuit, acting as a check on its
decisionmaking, despite the geometric increases in caseload.
And for those who remain more interested in the behavior of the Supreme
Court than the circuit courts, remember that six of the nine sitting justices once
served on circuit courts. 170 Were they, like most of the judges in my study,
single-minded seekers of policy during their appeals court tenure? Or, did they
play a strategic role? Did they change their approach to judging after ascension
to the high court? Perhaps an appeals court swing judge becomes an ideologue
after appointment to the Supreme Court because she has now satisfied her
ambition and no longer has to check her political views at the courthouse door.
I suggest only a few possible questions prompted by the results of my
theory. Future analyses will hopefully address these questions and, in addition,
continue where I have left off by exploring other circuit courts with an eye to
discerning whether the theory I have developed here is unique to the Fourth
Circuit or sufficiently universal to inform our expectations about all appeals
court judges.
170 Justice John Paul Stevens served on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit from 1970 until his appointment to the Supreme Court by President Gerald Ford in
1975. President Reagan's first appointment to the Supreme Court was then-D.C. Circuit
Judge Antonin Scalia, who served on the court of appeals from 1982 until 1986. Justice
Anthony Kennedy, appointed by President Ronald Reagan to succeed Justice Lewis Powell in
1988, sat on the Ninth Circuit for 13 years. Bush appointee Justice Clarence Thomas served
for one year on the D.C. Circuit, from 1990 until 1991. Both of President Bill Clinton's
appointments to the Court have been elevated from circuit courts: Justice Ruth Bader
Ginsburg served on the D.C. Circuit from 1980 until 1993 and Justice Stephen Breyer served
on the First Circuit from 1980 until 1994. See EPSTEIN Er AL., supra note 2, at 222-26, 296-
303; THE OxFoRD COMANIoN TO THE SuPmEm COURT OF THE UNrTED STATES 482-83, 756,
836, 870-71 (Kermit L. Hall ed., 1992).
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